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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 An important feature of the corporate form of business is the agency relationship 
between owners and managers. Minimizing agency costs i.e. the costs arising from the 
conflicts in this relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), is the primary focus of scholars 
and practitioners of corporate governance. For example, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
describe corporate governance as dealing with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
the corporation assure themselves of getting a return to their investment. Fama & Jensen 
(1983) argue that the board of directors is the primary governance mechanism internal to 
firms. Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Demsetz (1983) argue that ownership structure is 
the primary firm-level governance mechanism external to firms. These two governance 
mechanisms are the focus of this dissertation. 
 This dissertation extends the literature on the ownership and board structure of 
firms by examining the adjustments that take place in these mechanisms during periods 
of corporate restructuring. The first essay examines the evolution of ownership structure 
of corporate spinoffs. I document the changes in the ownership structure of spinoffs to 
answer the following questions: what explains the changes in ownership structure and do 
the changes have any implications for firm performance and survival? The second essay 
documents changes in the board structure of acquiring firms in the banking industry and 
examines the determinants of participation of target directors on the board of the merged 
firm. 
 Most empirical studies of governance mechanisms focus on static examinations 
since firm governance changes slowly over time. The results in this dissertation provide 
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scarce new evidence of how governance mechanisms evolve in response to radical 
changes in the nature of the firm. The experimental setting in this dissertation makes it 
possible to relate changes in governance to changes in firm characteristics. This feature of 
the experimental setting also significantly mitigates the problem of endogeneity – 
widespread in studies of governance. These aspects of this dissertation constitute a 
significant departure from the existing reliance on reduced form analyses to relate 
governance to firm characteristics. 
Most empirical examinations of governance mechanisms1 employ a cross-section 
or panel of firms to estimate the relation between governance and firm performance or 
other firm outcomes such as CEO dismissal, takeover premium etc. The model used by 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) in the context of board structure is very useful to 
summarize the methodology and the associated problems. 
(managerial action)t+s = φ(governance characteristic)t + εt (1) 
(firm performance)t+s = β(managerial action)t + ηt  (2) 
(governance characteristic)t+s= µ(firm performance)t + ξt (3) 
ε, η, and ξ denote the rest of the model including errors. The subscript t denotes time and 
s (≥0) is used to create an appropriate lead-lag relation. The intuition of the model is that 
existing governance affects managerial action, managerial action affects firm 
performance and firm performance affects future governance. 
 However there are few empirical studies that estimate structural models such as 
the one described above (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1994 is a notable exception). Instead, most 
studies carry out reduced form analyses that typically combine equation (1) and (2) as 
follows: 
                                                 
1 See Bibliography 
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(firm performance)t+s = β(φ(governance characteristic)t + εt)+ ηt.  (4) 
To the extent that ε and η are incomplete there exists a problem of endogeneity that has 
been a significant issue of concern in the governance literature (Coles, Lemmon & 
Meschke, 2003, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). This problem is exacerbated by the 
relatively slow pace of change of firms’2 governance mechanisms, which reduces the 
efficacy of using lags in overcoming it. Core & Larcker (2001) argue that the process of 
adjustment of ownership structure could be slow due to significant costs of adjustment. 
These costs of adjustment and their variation across firms could make it difficult to 
measure the relation between current performance and future governance in structural 
models e.g. equation (3) in the model above. 
By focusing on significant restructuring events and examining governance in 
event time this dissertation lessens most of the above mentioned problems. In an event 
time approach, changes in the governance mechanisms that occur in response to an event 
are examined. Therefore the more difficult measurement of the changes in governance 
mechanisms due to past changes in firm performance is avoided, thereby eliminating the 
need for structural systems such as the one described above.  Second, by an appropriate 
choice of event, it is possible to ensure that the required changes in the governance 
mechanisms are sufficiently large. In other words it is possible to find events where the 
costs of adjustment of governance mechanisms are below the benefits of the resulting 
changes, at least on an ex-ante basis. Finally, unlike a reduced form analysis that relates 
the variation in governance mechanisms to variation in firm characteristics in an event 
                                                 
2 For example, for ownership structure see Barclay & Holderness (1989), Denis & Sarin (1999), Zhou 
(2001) and for board structure see Lehn, Patro & Zhao (2005) 
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time approach it is possible to establish a more direct relation between changes in 
governance mechanisms and changes in firm characteristics.  
The relative advantage of the event time approach hinges on an appropriate choice 
of event. In the first essay, to study ownership structure I choose corporate spinoffs. 
Spinoffs inherit the ownership structure of the parent from which they are spun off. 
Specifically, in a transaction where 100% of the shares of the spinoff are distributed to 
the shareholders of the parent firm, the spinoff begins with an ownership structure that is 
identical to the ownership structure of the parent as of the record date of the distribution. 
This creates a unique experimental setting in which ownership structure is held constant 
and firm characteristics such as size, risk, extent of growth opportunities and industry are 
changed radically i.e. from the pre-spinoff parent firm characteristics to those of the 
spinoff. The diagram below shows the event time line for the study. 
        Spinoff occurs between Yr 0 and Yr 1 
   
           Yr0      Yr1        Yr2   Yr3 
Parent unit consists of spinoff division and remaining post-spinoff parent 
Using a sample of 117 spinoffs in the period 1980 through 2000 I find that the 
ownership structure of spinoffs measured by the level of block ownership (a block owner 
in this study is one who owns at least 5% of the voting rights of the firm), changes 
rapidly and significantly increasing from a mean inherited block ownership (used 
interchangeably with prior ownership) level of 20.34% (year 0) to a mean of 27.35% in 
year 3. In year 1 the mean and median block ownership is significantly different from that 
of a matching sample of seasoned firms chosen on the basis of size and industry. By year 
3 the difference in the two samples becomes insignificant. 
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The change in block ownership of spinoffs measured relative to the inherited 
ownership structure is significantly related to differences between spinoffs and pre-
spinoff parents in firm and industry characteristics in ways that are consistent with 
efficiencies in monitoring. These characteristics include differences in firm size and 
market-to-book ratio, measures of industry relatedness, the inherited level of block 
ownership and the long run survival of the spinoff. I use three measures of industry 
relatedness – differences in SIC codes, correlation of stock returns and the vertical 
relatedness measure of Fan & Lang (2000). 
The difference in block ownership between spinoffs and matching firms is 
insignificantly related to differences in firm characteristics in year 1. By year 3 
differences in firm size, idiosyncratic risk (measured by the standard error from a market 
model), the market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility (measured by the ratio of plant, 
property and equipment to book assets) and long run survival are significantly related to 
differences in the block ownership of the two samples. 
Regarding firm performance (survival) and changes in block ownership – I find 
that changes in the block ownership of spinoffs are significantly positively related to the 
changes in the market valuation measured by the market-to-book ratio (survival) of the 
spinoffs in year 3 and either insignificantly or less significantly related in the earlier 
years. Similarly, the difference in market valuation of spinoffs and matching firms is 
significantly positively associated with the corresponding difference in block ownership 
in year 3.  
The results of the first essay constitute scarce new evidence on the extent of 
changes in ownership structure and their determinants. Although ownership structure of 
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seasoned firms changes slowly over time, when circumstances warrant significant 
changes on an ex-ante basis they are indeed observed ex-post. Unlike previous studies the 
results provide direct support to existing arguments made in the literature that the 
variation in ownership structure is endogenous to firm characteristics (Demsetz & Lehn 
1985, Himmelberg Hubbard & Palia 1999). The positive association between firm 
performance (survival) and past changes in block ownership suggests that greater 
ownership concentration may be valuable to firms. This is subject to the condition that 
the market-to-book ratio is an appropriate measure of firm performance. An alternative 
explanation for the positive relation between block ownership and the market-to-book 
ratio is that the market-to-book ratio is a proxy for the extent of growth opportunities and 
firms with more growth opportunities need greater monitoring and therefore have more 
concentrated ownership structures.  
Even assuming that the market-to-book ratio is an appropriate measure of 
performance, it must be noted that the evidence is insufficient to infer the causality of 
ownership structure in determining firm performance. The increase in block ownership 
could either cause an improvement in performance or could be a reflection of the superior 
stock picking abilities of the block owners. 
In the second essay, to study board structure I choose a sample of firms from the 
banking industry that carry out mergers and acquisitions. Compared to most other 
investment decisions made by firms, mergers and acquisitions are bigger and usually 
carry greater implications for effective firm monitoring. Similar to a spinoff, around a 
merger, firm characteristics of the acquirer, such as firm size, risk and the extent of 
growth opportunities change significantly. This in turn changes the monitoring task that 
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is the raison d’etre of corporate boards. I document changes in the board structure of 
acquiring firms to relate the participation of target directors on the board of the merged 
firm to proxies for changes in the monitoring task of the board of directors of the 
acquired firm. 
Using a sample of 141 acquisitions in the banking industry I find that there is a 
significant 14% increase in board size post-merger and an insignificant change in 
composition. The probability of hiring at least one target director is positively associated 
with the size and accounting performance of the target measured relative to the acquirer, 
negatively related to the similarity of the target and acquirer as measured by the 
correlation of stock returns in the pre-merger period and insignificantly related to the size 
of the target board. 
The number of target directors hired is similarly positively related to the relative 
size and accounting performance of the target and negatively related to the stock return 
correlation. In addition the number of target directors hired is positively related to the 
relative market-to-book ratio of the target and significantly negatively related to the 
ownership stake of the target directors. The last result is consistent with a disciplining 
argument – target boards with greater ownership are entrenched and therefore not chosen 
to the board of the merged firm. Alternatively, the result is consistent with the regularity 
that high ownership usually occurs in small and family owned banks where the 
willingness to merge may also signal the willingness to cash stakes and exit the business. 
The rational variation in the choice of target directors combined with the fact that 
the increase in the average board size of the acquirer is actually smaller than the average 
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number of target directors hired shows that mergers, while contributing to increases in 
board size, are unlikely to decrease their effectiveness as monitoring mechanisms. 
Overall, the results of this dissertation show that governance mechanisms of firms 
adapt to changes in monitoring requirements resulting from changes in asset 
characteristics. There is an extensive literature which shows that firm governance is 
determined endogenously by monitoring requirements. This dissertation extends this 
literature by giving a glimpse into the process by which this occurs and thus helps clarify 
the main implication of this literature – not accounting for firms’ abilities to self-adjust 
their governance could result in misleading measurements of the consequences of 
governance on firm performance and eventually in misguided policy changes. The rest of 
this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 studies the ownership structure of 
spinoffs and Chapter 3 studies the board structure of bank acquirers. Chapter 4 concludes. 
 
 8
Chapter 2 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the evolution of the ownership structure of corporate 
spinoffs i.e. firms that are spun off by parent companies. At inception these firms inherit 
the ownership structure of the parent from which they are spun off. This feature of 
spinoffs combined with the fact that the assets of spinoffs are different from those of their 
parents creates a unique experimental setting for examining ownership structures that are 
unlikely to be in equilibrium. I exploit this experimental setting to test hypotheses 
regarding changes in ownership structure, the determinants of the changes, and the 
relation between ownership structure and firm performance and survival. 
Most previous analysis of ownership structure is of mature or large firms and is 
seldom associated with corporate events that significantly change the nature of the firm. 
This precludes significant changes in the distribution of ownership structure of the firms 
studied.  Several papers that examine the issue find that ownership structure exhibits high 
serial correlation. These include Denis & Sarin (1999), who study inside ownership and 
Zhou (2001), who examines changes in managerial ownership. Barclay & Holderness 
(1989) find that once a firm has a block holder it usually has one five years later. This 
high serial correlation in turn impedes analysis of changes in ownership structure – a 
potentially rewarding avenue of research, especially in the context of the ongoing debate 
over the causes and consequences of ownership structure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
I overcome this problem by identifying a setting that warrants large changes in 
ownership structure. If ownership structure is determined endogenously, then the 
ownership structure inherited by spinoffs will change in response to differences between 
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the monitoring requirements of parent companies and spinoffs. This could be due to 
significant differences in attributes such as firm size, risk, growth options and industry 
mix. As an illustration of the changes that I expect, consider the ownership structure of 
Corn Products, spun-off by Bestfoods. The parent, Bestfoods, had no 5% block holder 
listed in the proxy statements prior to the spinoff or in the subsequent years. In contrast, 
in its first proxy statement, Corn Products had one block holder (FMR Corp) holding 8% 
of the shares. In year 2 total block holdings increased to 25%, decreased to 17% in year 3, 
12% in year 4 and finally increased to 22% in year 5. Similar differences are found in a 
comparison of managerial ownership (i.e. ownership of the officers and directors of the 
firm). Figure 1A and 1B illustrate the differences between parent and spinoff for block 
and managerial ownership respectively.   
In addition to finding a natural experiment to examine ownership structure, this 
chapter identifies a gap in the literature on spinoffs. Although the literature on spinoffs is 
extensive, relatively little is known about the governance of these firms. A frequently 
cited motivation for spinoffs and a potential source of value gains associated with 
spinoffs3, 4 is the improvement in firm monitoring due to more efficient managerial 
incentives and a reduction in information problems. However, the role of ownership 
structure as a monitoring mechanism has remained largely ignored. It is addressed in this 
chapter. 
                                                 
3 See Hite & Owers 1983, Miles & Rosenfeld 1983, and Schipper & Smith 1983 for the extent of value 
gains due to spinoffs. 
4 Empirical examinations of the sources of value gains associated with spinoffs include increases in focus 
(Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar 1997, Desai & Jain 1999 and Schlingemann, Stulz & Walkling 2002), 
improvements in information quality (Krishnaswami & Subramanian 1999, Gilson, Healy, Noe & Palepu 
2001), better access to capital markets (Krishnaswami & Subramanian 1999) and more efficient managerial 
incentives (Seward & Walsh 1996). 
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Using a sample of 117 spinoffs from 1981 through 2000 I test several predictions 
about ownership structure and its changes. The primary measure of ownership structure is 
the total holdings of owners of more than 5% of the voting shares of the spinoff 
(henceforth block ownership5). The hypotheses concern the magnitude of changes in 
block ownership, the determinants of these changes and their relation to firm 
performance and survival. A description of salient findings is below.  
Regarding the changes in block ownership I find the following: 
• In a three (five) year window the block ownership of spinoffs shows an average 
increase of about 7 (7) percentage points.  This increase is significant both 
economically and statistically and is significantly higher than the corresponding 
change in a sample of mature matching firms chosen on the basis of size and 
industry.  
• A large part of this change, about 4 percentage points, occurs in the first year. The 
changes in block ownership become progressively smaller and less significant.  
Also, the increase in ownership concentration is mainly due to the increase in 
outside block holdings i.e. where the beneficial owner is unaffiliated to the 
management of the firm – block holdings of insiders (i.e. officers and directors) 
show no significant change over time.  
• There are patterns similar to those above, in the cross-sectional correlation 
between the inherited block ownership and the subsequent block ownership of 
spinoffs – the correlation declines sharply from 0.57 in year 1, to approximately 
0.39 in years 2 and 3. The correlation is smaller and the fall in correlation is larger 
than in the matching sample over a similar period (for the matching sample the 
correlation falls from 0.89 to 0.80).  
• Combined with evidence on other dimensions of ownership structure these 
findings suggest that the ownership structure of spinoffs reaches a steady state in 
a period of approximately 3 years. 
 
Regarding the determinants of changes in block ownership I find the following: 
• Measures of relatedness of the spinoff and parent and differences in size and 
market-to-book ratio are significantly related to changes in block ownership of 
spinoffs. However the most significant determinant of these changes is the block 
ownership of the parent prior to the spinoff.  Firms with greater beginning block 
ownership have smaller subsequent changes in block ownership. This result 
persists with strong significance after including other determinants of the changes 
in block ownership and is consistent with concavity of returns to increases in 
ownership concentration.  
                                                 
5 In the rest of the paper I use ownership structure and block ownership interchangeably.  
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• Similarly, differences between spinoffs and matching seasoned firms, in firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, idiosyncratic risk, asset tangibility (measured as the ratio of 
property, plan and equipment to book value of assets) and long run survival are 
significantly positively related to differences in block ownership in ways that are 
consistent with efficiencies in monitoring.  
• In a regression setting, in the first year of the firms’ existence, the fit between the 
ownership structure and asset characteristics of spinoffs (adjusted R-square 37%) 
is at least as good as the corresponding fit for the matched sample (adjusted R-
square 22%). Also, the inherited block ownership is provided a poor fit by the 
asset characteristics of the spinoff (adjusted R-square is 7%).  
 
Regarding the survival and firm performance of spinoffs I find the following: 
• Firm survival of spinoffs is significantly positively related to past changes in 
block ownership and is marginally positively related to the inherited block 
ownership. 
• Changes in the market-to-book ratio of spinoffs are similarly positively related to 
past changes in block ownership, but unrelated to the inherited block ownership. 
There is no such association for the sample of matching firms nor are there any 
similar patterns in either sample when accounting measures of performance are 
used. 
• The difference in the market-to-book ratio of spinoffs and matching firms is 
increasingly significantly related to the corresponding difference in block 
ownership as the spinoffs season. 
• In a simultaneous equation framework I find that the relation between the market-
to-book ratio and block ownership of spinoffs becomes less significant over time 
and more similar to the corresponding relation in the sample of matching non-
spinoffs. 
 
The results have several implications. First, the results suggest that though ownership 
structure is highly serially correlated, when circumstances warrant it, ownership structure 
does change significantly and tends to move towards a new equilibrium. Second, the 
movement towards a new equilibrium is governed by tradeoffs that are known in the 
literature to influence the establishment of the optimal ownership structure of firms. 
Third, the changes in block ownership are positively associated with enhancements in the 
stock valuation of spinoffs and the probability of their survival. This result combined 
with the absence of results in tests of operating performance is consistent with the prior 
literature on spinoffs that finds improvements in the operating performance of parent 
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firms (Daley et al 1997) and the stock valuation of the spinoffs (Krishnaswami & 
Subramaniam 1999). Finally, as spinoffs move towards a new equilibrium ownership 
structure the association between firm performance and ownership structure becomes 
insignificant. Overall the results are consistent with ownership structure being determined 
by efficiencies in monitoring and considerations of value-maximization. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the choice of 
spinoffs for a study of ownership structure. I then describe the typical spinoff process and 
develop the hypotheses. In Section 3 I list the data sources and describe the sample 
selection procedure. In Section 4 I present descriptive statistics of the spinoffs and 
matching firms and compare the cross-sectional properties of ownership structure of 
these two sets of firms. Section 5 contains results regarding changes in block ownership 
and the relation between block ownership and firm performance and survival. Section 6 
discusses the robustness of the results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review, Institutional Details and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Using spinoffs to study changes in ownership structure 
A majority of the empirical literature that examines ownership structure, studies 
the determinants of the level of ownership concentration and its relation to firm 
performance. These studies are usually cross-sectional (see Demsetz & Lehn 1985, 
Demsetz & Villalonga 2001, Agrawal & Knoeber 1996 and Cho 1998). Himmelberg, 
Hubbard & Palia (1999) a longitudinal study – is a notable exception. Changes in 
ownership structure of firms are relatively less studied. Gilson (1990) studies changes in 
the block ownership of firms that default on their debt obligations.  Parrino, Sias & Starks 
(2003) study changes in institutional ownership around forced CEO turnover. Denis & 
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Sarin (1999) study the relation between changes in managerial ownership and board 
structure over a ten year period. Kole & Lehn (1999) study inside and block ownership in 
the airline industry around deregulation. Frye & Smith (2003) study changes in the block 
and managerial ownership of IPO firms in the four years subsequent to the issue. Wruck 
(1989) finds an average increase in ownership concentration of 6 percentage points in a 
sample of firms that carry out private placements of equity6 during the first half of the 
1980s. Franks, Mayer & Rossi (2003) study the evolution of ownership of a sample of 
UK firms incorporated in the early 1900s.  Gompers & Metrick (2000) study secular 
trends in institutional ownership. 
In a study relating to spinoffs, Abarbanell, Bushee and Raedy (2003) examine 
changes in the institutional ownership of spinoffs and parent firms around the 
announcement and effective date of the spinoff transaction. The motivation of their study, 
institutional investor preferences and the impact of institutional trading on abnormal 
returns, is vastly different from the motivation of this chapter.   
A key aspect of ownership structure that discourages studies of its changes is that 
it usually changes slowly over time. Core & Larcker (2001) argue that the slow pace of 
change of ownership structure could be due to the significant costs attached to it7. Until 
the marginal loss due to a departure from the first-best ownership structure is not greater 
than the marginal cost of changing it, the ownership structure of a firm will remain 
unchanged. Consistent with this argument, most of the studies mentioned above, focus on 
                                                 
6 Barclay, Holderness & Sheehan (2003) study private placements between 1979 and 1997 and find that 
blocks are often used to solidify management control. 
7 Documented block premiums ranging from 5.5% (Mikkelson & Regassa (1991)) to 16% (Barclay & 
Holderness (1989)) are indicative of the magnitude of costs of concentrating ownership. 
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circumstances that significantly affect the marginal cost-benefit trade-off of changes in 
ownership structure. 
In this respect this chapter is similar to the studies mentioned above. However, 
different from these studies I find a setting in which the cost-benefit tradeoff of changes 
in ownership structure is affected along multiple dimensions, all of which have 
monitoring implications. In a corporate spinoff the ownership structure of the firm is held 
constant while the nature of the firm is fundamentally changed. Spinoffs usually operate 
in a different industry, are of a different size than the parent firm, have significantly 
different growth opportunities and quite often require distinctly different management 
styles. All these factors affect the monitoring task and therefore the marginal cost-benefit 
tradeoff of changes in ownership structure. In addition to benefits arising from separation 
of operations, the very reason that firms are spun-off suggests that there may be benefits 
to separate and differential monitoring of firms.  
The second advantage of using spinoffs is that, unlike IPO firms, the ownership 
structure at the inception of the firm is more likely inappropriate for spinoffs. Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) argue that as long as public investors are rational, the costs and benefits 
of the chosen ownership structure will be reflected in the offer price of a firm’s IPO and 
thus internalized by the entrepreneur who decides the initial ownership structure8. It is 
less likely that such arguments extend to the ownership structure of spinoffs. Other than 
differences in asset characteristics, this is supported by the fact that spinoffs can be a last 
resort for firms to divest assets. This could be due to a combination of the failure to find 
the right price for an outright sale of assets and poor conditions in the IPO market. 
                                                 
8 This view has been challenged by Bebchuk & Zingales (1996) who argue that although the ownership 
structure chosen may maximize private benefits it could be sub-optimal in terms of social benefits. 
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Another advantage of using spinoff transactions for such a study is that ownership 
structure is rarely cited as a motive for spinoffs. This alleviates potential problems of 
endogeneity. Specifically, if there were important ownership-structure related 
motivations for spinoffs, an examination of changes in ownership structure would need to 
account for those first. However, examination of press articles relating to sample 
transactions shows little evidence that this is the case. To that extent, spinoffs present a 
relatively clean experimental setting in terms of the endogeneity of the transaction to the 
variables under study9.  
 The final advantage of using spinoffs for a study of changes in ownership 
structure is that, like IPO firms, spinoffs can choose a host of other firm and governance 
characteristics in an efficient manner. These include firm leverage, board size and 
composition and executive compensation design. These firm and governance 
characteristics are known to be systematically related to the ownership structure of firms 
and efficient choices of these, simplifies hypothesis development. Dittmar (2004) finds 
that the leverage ratio of spinoffs is similar to comparable non-spinoffs. Although 
empirical tests are limited, the academic literature on spinoffs often suggests improved 
incentive alignment as a motivation for spinoffs (Schipper & Smith 1986, Miles & 
Woolridge 1999).  This is also a motivation cited frequently by financial managers.  
Regarding board structure, casual examination of sample transactions shows that spinoff 
boards are formed with care and deliberation. The boards are often formed several 
months prior to the distribution and consist of executives from the parent and spinoff, and 
                                                 
9 One possible significant motivation for a spinoff may be the desire of a controlling family to reduce their 
stake in a part of the business. I check this possibility in the empirical tests and find little evidence of the 
existence of such divestiture motives. 
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outside directors. There is usually a plan of transition for the spinoff board to become 
independent around the time of the distribution10. The efficient choice of all these 
monitoring mechanisms increases the likelihood that changes in ownership structure are 
isolated and therefore more observable. 
2.2 Institutional details 
Because I aim to explore the evolution of ownership structures that are inherited, I 
focus on institutional details in order to find out if there are ways in which the ownership 
structure of the spinoff may depart from an exact replication of the ownership structure of 
the parent firm. The description below shows that after excluding spinoffs where less 
than 100% of the ownership is distributed there is little institutional provision for this to 
happen. 
Spinoffs are usually structured as pro-rata tax-free dividend distributions. In order 
to distinguish them from ordinary taxable dividends an IRS ruling is required. The typical 
spinoff transaction is made contingent upon this ruling. The conditions for the 
distribution to be tax-free are detailed in Appendix A. The sample in this paper is 
restricted to tax-free transactions. The transaction is also filed with the SEC (Form 10)11. 
Finally, if exchange listing is proposed, details are provided to the exchange. This sample 
is restricted to issues that trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. 
The two major steps for a proposed spinoff to be effective are that the SEC 
declares the Form 10 filing effective and that the IRS rules the transaction tax-free. By 
this stage in the process, a shareholder vote has been obtained, and a record date as well 
                                                 
10 Wruck & Wruck (2002) study top management defined as consisting of the chairman, CEO and president 
but do not study board structure. 
11Based on certain guidelines (also listed in Appendix A) the SEC distinguishes between a usual sale of 
securities that requires registration of the transaction under the Securities Act 1933 and a spinoff that 
requires registration of the new security under Securities Exchange Act 1934.  
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as a proposed distribution date set. For this sample the median duration between the first 
public information of the transaction and the actual declaration date of the deal is 
approximately seven months and spans the period during which SEC approval and the 
IRS ruling are obtained.  
All holders of record on the record date are entitled to the dividend on a pro-rata 
basis (cash payments are made for fractional shares). In order to ensure an exact 
replication of the ownership structure I exclude any spinoffs where less than 100% of the 
shares are distributed. The median duration between the dividend declaration date and the 
payment date is approximately 15 days. During this period, beginning shortly after the 
declaration date, the stock of the newly formed independent company is traded on a 
when-issued basis12. For a sample of 28 two-stage spinoffs, Ezzell, Miles & Mulherin 
(2001) document a mean duration of 15 days of when-issued trading. Choi & Strong 
(1983) document a similar duration for stock splits.  The parent firm usually trades in two 
ways – regular-way and when-issued13. In Exhibit A the process discussed above is 
illustrated with the spinoff of Roxio Inc. from Adaptec Inc.  
                                                 
12 When-issued trading differs from regular trading (also called regular-way trading) in several aspects. 
Whereas regular-way trades are settled five business days after the trade, when-issued trades are not settled 
until 5 days after the issue date. Thus the purchase of when-issued shares reflects an interest free borrowing 
for the buyer for the duration that is incremental to a normal settlement cycle. This is reflected in the form 
of a price premium (Vijh 1994). Empirical studies of the when-issued market find that when-issued shares 
are quoted and traded significantly less frequently than comparable regular-way traded shares. This 
illiquidity of when-issued shares is reflected in the form of wider bid-ask spreads.  Vijh (1994) and Ezzell, 
Miles & Mulherin (2001) note that financial institutions often have restrictions on investing in when-issued 
shares. This temporarily restricts demand for the shares of the spinoffs. Given a downward sloping demand 
curve this could cause a significantly positive abnormal return on stocks of spinoffs on the ex-date. This 
issue is examined by Abarbanell, Bushee & Raedy  (2003). In this paper I examine ownership on an annual 
basis and therefore abstract from these fluctuations. 
13 In regular-way trading, shares of the parent firm trade cum-dividend until the payment date and 
shareholders selling before the effective date will also be selling the right to receive shares of common 
stock in the spinoff. All such sellers, being holders of record will receive the shares of the spinoff from the 
company (or via their broker if they hold the shares in the “street name”) and will in turn deliver these 
shares to the ultimate (post-record date) buyer. When-issued shares of the parent firm reflect the spinoff of 
the subsidiary, and buyers of such shares are not entitled to shares of the subsidiary firm. 
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Usually the ownership structure of the parent firm that is replicated i.e. the 
ownership structure on the record date, is unobservable. Therefore I use the last recorded 
ownership structure of the parent firm as a proxy. In order to ensure the integrity of this 
proxy I eliminate spinoff transactions where there are significant alterations in the 
ownership structure of the parent firm between the last ownership date and the record 
date (discussed further in Section 3). 
2.3 Hypotheses 
2.3.1 Changes in ownership structure  
Recent studies of spinoffs document an average relative market value of 
approximately 30% (Krishnaswami & Subramniam 1999) and an average relative risk 
(ratio of standard deviation of stock returns of the spinoff to the parent) of 130% 
(Abarbanell, Bushee & Raedy 2001) . The relatively smaller size of spinoffs and the 
benefits of greater monitoring of higher risk firms imply greater net benefits of an 
increase in ownership concentration. Based on this, I expect an average increase in the 
ownership concentration of these firms.  
Past studies of ownership structure suggest that it changes slowly. Kole & Lehn 
(1999) document changes in the ownership structure of airline firms over a 15 year period 
around the industry’s deregulation. Frye & Smith (2003) document quicker changes for a 
sample of IPO firms. They find that block ownership increases by approximately 8% in 
the 4 years after the IPO. Given the relatively bigger shock associated with a spinoff I 
expect the adjustment process of ownership structure of spinoffs to be quicker. However 
it may still take more than a year if institutional and other potential block owners would 
like to observe the spinoff firm as an independent entity before making decisions 
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regarding ownership. For example, a one year period allows the passing of milestones 
such as publication of the first financial statements of the new entity and completion of 
an earnings cycle.  
If the increase in ownership concentration of spinoffs is in response to the shock 
to the nature of the firm then the impact of the shock should reduce over time – this 
means the increases should get progressively smaller. I also expect the cross-sectional 
correlation of block ownership of the spinoff firm and its inherited block ownership to 
decrease over time. This expectation is consistent with the argument that the new 
ownership structure of the spinoffs is not a trivial conversion of the inherited ownership 
structure (for example, spinoffs are uniformly more concentrated than their respective 
parents). 
Because changes in ownership structure over time are inevitable (albeit usually 
small) it is important to compare spinoffs to a set benchmark firms.  I use benchmark 
firms chosen on the basis of size, industry and maturity. Using mature firms makes it 
possible to compare ownership structures that are likely to be in equilibrium to those that 
are unlikely to be in equilibrium. The greater maturity of the matching firms means that 
these firms are more likely to have equilibrium ownership structures. Therefore, I expect 
the changes in the ownership structure of spinoffs to be significantly larger than those of 
the seasoned sample. Also, ensuring that there is no systematic restructuring activity14 in 
the benchmark sample implies there should be little change in the ownership structure of 
the matching firms. The differences in the ownership structure of the spinoffs and the 
matching firms should decrease over time and the cross-sectional correlation should 
                                                 
14 In forming the matching sample I ensure that no significant restructuring activities take place in these 
firms. 
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increase over time. The last two expectations are based on the assumption that a mature, 
size and industry matched firm serves as an appropriate benchmark of ownership 
structure. If this is indeed the case then the ownership structure of the spinoffs should 
resemble that of the matching firms more closely over time. However, given the limited 
evidence on the intra-industry and inter-industry variation in ownership structure, there 
exists a joint hypothesis problem in tests that use benchmark firms. 
2.3.2 Changes in ownership structure and their relation to firm characteristics
Whereas the earlier sub-section dealt with changes in the distribution of 
ownership structure of spinoffs the hypotheses in this section relate to the cross-section of 
these changes. For the remaining hypotheses in the paper I focus on the block ownership 
of spinoffs because this is the dimension of ownership that is replicated and therefore the 
direct subject of the tests. I use variables that are commonly used in the ownership 
literature (for e.g. Himmelberg et al 1999) to predict changes in the block ownership of 
spinoffs. 
Size and control potential - Given the well-documented negative relation between firm 
size and block ownership, ceteris paribus, the larger the spinoff relative to the parent the 
smaller the increase in ownership concentration of the spinoff. Similarly, the greater the 
control potential of the spinoff (relative to the parent), the larger the increase in 
ownership concentration, ceteris paribus. Demsetz & Lehn (1985) define control potential 
as the wealth gain achievable through more effective monitoring of managers by a firm’s 
owners. Following Demsetz & Lehn (1985) I use the standard error of estimate calculated 
from fitting the market model using 36 observations of monthly returns beginning with 
 21
the spinoffs’ independent existence. To estimate the parent’s idiosyncratic risk I use the 
36 months preceding the first firm announcement of the spinoff. 
Industry relatedness – Asset characteristics of firms vary across industry. However it is 
unlikely that all differences in monitoring trade-offs across industries are captured by 
differences in asset characteristics. Spinoffs are often in industries unrelated to the 
industry of the parent firm. Dittmar (2004) documents 50% of her sample spinoffs are in 
different 1-digit SIC industries and 90% in different 4-digit SIC industries. Further, 
Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar (1997) and Schlingemann, Stulz & Walkling (2002) find 
that gains from spinoff transactions are concentrated in unrelated spinoffs. This provides 
an added basis for exploring the influence of industry differences in determining changes 
in block ownership.   
I measure industry relatedness using SIC codes and the correlation in monthly 
stock returns of the post-spinoff parent and the spinoff in the 3 years subsequent to the 
spinoff. Additionally I use Fan & Lang’s (2000) measures of vertical relatedness and 
industry complementarity. These measures are calculated using commodity flow data 
from the Benchmark Input-Output Account for the U.S. Economy. Vertical relatedness is 
calculated as follows. Define aij as the dollar value of industry i’s output required to 
produce industry j’s total output. Vij is defined as aij divided by the dollar output of 
industry j. The relatedness of spinoffs and parents is calculated as ½(Vij+ Vji) where i and 
j are the parent and spinoff industry respectively15. This measure captures the extent to 
which the spinoff industry and the parent industry are dependent on each other for inputs 
and outputs.  
                                                 
15 Fan provides the concordance between SIC codes and the industry classification used in the input-output 
tables. 
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Complementarity is calculated as follows. For spinoff industry i calculate the 
fraction supplied to each other industry k (except the parent industry). This gives us a 
vector Vik . In a similar manner calculate Bik as the fraction obtained as input from each 
industry (except the parent industry). Calculate corresponding vectors Vjk and Bjk where j 
is the parent industry. Complementarity is calculated as ½(corr(Vik Vjk)+corr(Bik Bjk )). 
This measure captures the extent to which the parent and spinoff industry depend on the 
same other industries i.e. non-spinoff and non-parent industries, for inputs and outputs.  
Market-to-book ratio16 - This ratio, frequently used as a proxy for Tobin’s Q, captures 
components of firm performance and also asset characteristics such as tangibility and the 
extent of growth options (Smith & Watts 1992). In the literature on ownership structure 
Q is frequently used as a measure of firm performance (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988). 
In a study of spinoffs and internal capital markets Gertner, Powers & Scharfstein (2002) 
use Q as a proxy for investment opportunities. In this sample of spinoffs I find that poor 
performance is frequently associated with low growth and declining demand. For 
example, this is true of defense industry related spinoffs in the early 90s of Western Atlas 
by Litton Industries and Tripos by Evans and Sutherland, and the semi-conductor 
industry related spinoffs in the late 90s of Varian Semiconductor by Varian Associates 
and Conexant Systems by Rockwell International. This feature of spinoffs complicates 
hypotheses relating to Q. To the extent that Q captures growth options (and therefore 
control potential), higher relative Q will lead to a greater increase in ownership 
concentration. However to the extent that Q captures poorer performance, lower relative 
Q will lead to a greater increase in ownership concentration. This is because there are 
greater benefits to monitoring firms that are doing poorly. In certain specifications I also 
                                                 
16 In most of the paper this is used interchangeably with Q. 
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use the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets as an inverse measure of the 
extent of growth options in the firm. 
Survivorship – The eventual survival of the company captures positive aspects of the 
stability and future growth of the firm that may not be captured by other variables. It is 
also the case that some spinoffs occur as a last resort for divesting assets. For such firms 
there is a known lower likelihood of survival since the optimal outcome may be a merger 
or liquidation. Presumably, such firms provide lower control potential to block owners 
(though they may provide sufficient control potential and synergies to a 100% acquirer). 
Therefore I expect that companies that survive as stand-alone entities over the long run 
will have greater increases in block ownership. I classify a firm as a survivor if the 
delisting code in the CRSP database as of December, 2003 is 100. All other firms are 
classified as non-survivors. 
Prior ownership - Assuming a concave relation between the level of block ownership 
and the benefits of monitoring, prior ownership concentration should be negatively 
related to subsequent changes in ownership concentration. This is similar to arguments 
made in the literature that assume exogeneity of ownership structure17. In the current 
setting it is applicable since the prior ownership structure is “exogenously” imposed on 
the spinoff firm and is unlikely to be its optimal ownership structure. 
Fit between firm characteristics and the level of ownership concentration – If the block 
ownership inherited by the spinoffs is inappropriate to their monitoring requirements, 
variation in the inherited (new) block ownership should be poorly (better) explained by 
its asset characteristics. If the process of adjustment has progressed adequately the fit 
                                                 
17 If ownership is determined endogenously and all firms are have the first-best ownership structure then a 
departure from this structure will have an effect on the firm which is of comparable magnitude irrespective 
of the level of ownership concentration. In this case the usual concavity argument does not hold. 
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between ownership concentration and asset characteristics of spinoffs should be 
comparable to that of the matching firms. This fit should improve over time as the 
ownership structure of the spinoff adjusts more completely to its asset characteristics. 
2.3.3 Differences in block ownership of spinoffs and matching firms 
 The previous subsection dealt with the changes in block ownership of spinoffs. 
Similar tests and hypotheses would apply to the difference in block ownership of the 
spinoffs and the matching firms. In the case of the parent firms the pre-spinoff parent’s 
ownership structure is relevant for comparison since it is the point of departure. However 
in the case of the matching firms a year-by-year matching is relevant since it would 
control for the potential effects of industry changes and secular trends. Therefore I 
measure the difference in block ownership of spinoffs and matching firms and run 
regressions on differences in firm characteristics. To the extent that the ownership 
structure of spinoffs gets better suited to firm characteristics over time the relation 
between differences in block ownership of spinoffs and matching firms and 
corresponding differences in firm characteristics should get more systematic and 
significant over time. 
2.3.4 Ownership structure and firm performance and survival – Beginning with Berle & 
Means (1932), there is a rich literature that argues about the inadequacy of corporate 
ownership structures in improving or maintaining firm performance. One commonly 
maintained hypothesis of this literature is that in a certain range of ownership 
concentration, management is able to entrench itself while reducing firm value (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1988 and Stulz 1988. Also see Wruck 1989, McConnell & Servaes 
1990 & 1995, Loderer & Martin 1997, Cho 1998, Holderness, Kroszner & Sheehan 
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199918,19). As mentioned earlier one complication in tests that measure the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance is that there is little change in ownership 
structure over time. The experimental setting on hand is uniquely suited to overcome this 
problem. 
 I hypothesize that the increase in block ownership of the spinoff is positively 
associated with changes in firm performance i.e. stock valuation (measured by the 
market-to-book ratio) and the probability of survival as a stand-alone entity. Core & 
Larcker (2002) argue that in the presence of significant costs, adjustments in ownership 
structure will not take place unless the counterbalancing benefits are comparable. This 
suggests that firm survival would be an appropriately significant performance measure. 
However, increases in the likelihood of firm survival could also stem simply from the 
difficulty in taking over a firm with more concentrated ownership and therefore need not 
necessarily be consistent with value-maximization20. This possibility necessitates the tests 
of stock valuations.  
An alternative approach to examining the performance implications of the 
changing ownership structure of spinoffs is to examine the relation between the 
differences in block ownership of the spinoffs and matching firms to the corresponding 
differences in the market-to-book ratio. The ownership structure of the matching firms is 
likely to be steady since these firms are mature. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, 
rapid and significant changes are expected in the spinoff sample. Due to the superior 
stock picking abilities of the block owners or due to their superior monitoring of the firms 
                                                 
18 Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) contains a comprehensive summary of the important evidence. 
19 However, there is little description of the ways in which such an ownership structure may result. 
20 It is also possible that the presence of a larger number of blockholders actually facilitates a takeover 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1989). 
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in which they acquire stakes or due to a greater need for monitoring high-Q firms, a 
positive relation is expected between the matching-firm-adjusted market-to-book ratio of 
spinoffs and the differences in block ownership between spinoffs and matching firms. 
Finally, I examine the relation between stock valuations (as opposed to changes in 
valuations) and the level of ownership of spinoffs. It is now well documented that after 
accounting for endogeneity there is no systematic relationship between the equilibrium 
ownership concentration of firms and their performance as measured by Q (Himmelberg, 
Hubbard & Palia, 1999 and Demsetz & Villalonga 2001)21. To the extent that the 
ownership structure of spinoffs has adjusted to its new equilibrium I should find a similar 
result for these firms. On the other hand a persistent significant relation between 
ownership structure and firm performance could mean that either these firms do not reach 
equilibrium or that the changes in ownership structure are not consistent with value-
maximizing considerations. In order to test these competing hypotheses of the relation 
between firm performance and block ownership of spinoffs, I follow the literature and 
use a simultaneous equation framework and compare the results to those of the matching 
firms.  
3. Sample selection and empirical methodology 
3.1 Sample selection of spinoffs 
I form an initial sample of spinoffs using a combination of CRSP distributions 
and spinoff transactions listed on the SDC Platinum Database. The time period used is 
1980-2000. I start with all CRSP distribution codes that begin with 37 or 38. Using SDC I 
identify all spinoff transactions between 1981 and 2000 where both the target (the spinoff 
                                                 
21 Coles, Meschke & Lemmon use a structural model to explain the observed relation between ownership 
structure and firm valuation. 
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firm) and the parent are public. I exclude 2-stage spinoffs. This results in an overlapping 
sample of 372 transactions from SDC and 582 distributions from CRSP. SDC has a 
smaller sample because data does not exist before 1984. Also, not all the distribution 
codes from CRSP are spinoffs – they also include some carve-outs, 2 stage spinoffs and 
rights issues. 
I use several filters on this original sample. The first criterion for inclusion is that 
the transaction has a distribution code in the CRSP database and adequate news stories 
are available on the Factiva news source. I reject 32 transactions because news stories 
regarding these transactions are unavailable or inadequate i.e. it is not possible to confirm 
the parent’s identity and/or the completion of the deal. Next I exclude all transactions if 
one or more of the following conditions are met (i) less than 100% of the firm is spun-off, 
(ii) the transaction is taxable (I obtain the tax-status of the transaction from Factiva and 
SDC) (iii) the spinoff occurs as a result of the parent merging with another company and 
(iv) the ownership structure of the parent firm changes significantly due to reasons not 
related to the spinoff.  
Point (iii) and (iv) above ensure that parent firms undertaking recaps, stock 
issuances (for mergers and other reasons) private placements and other transactions that 
could alter their ownership structure for reasons not related to the spinoff are excluded 
from the sample. I do this because measuring the inherited ownership structure is noisy 
for these transactions. This reduces the sample to a total of 249 transactions.  
The next requirement is that the spinoff should survive at least 3 years from the 
date of formation of the firm. This is to allow sufficient time to observe changes in 
ownership structure. This reduces the sample to 169 transactions. For this sample of 169 
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transactions I obtain ownership data from proxy statements. I use the Lexis-Nexis data 
source for electronic proxies. Usually Lexis-Nexis does not go back beyond 1987. 
Therefore, for the early sample I use the microfilm collection of proxy statements at the 
Penn State Business Library. I am able to find complete proxy data i.e. for a minimum of 
three years, for 117 spinoffs. Where available I collect up to five years of ownership data. 
Additional years are used to check the robustness of the results. The break-up by year and 
industry is in TABLE 1. I lose several transactions in the early 80s due to proxy 
unavailability. This is especially true of small firms and may create a size bias in the 
earlier part of the sample. 
3.2 Selection of matching firms 
The purpose of building a sample of matching firms is to compare ownership 
structures that are in equilibrium (matching firms) and those that are not (spinoffs). Given 
the purpose of matching I use the following algorithm. I create a universe of matches by 
matching each of the spinoffs against all Compustat firms, excluding the spinoffs and the 
parent firms. From this set of potential matches I eliminate matches if any of the 
following conditions are met (i) the market value of equity is less than 0.7 or greater than 
1.3 times the market value of equity of the spinoff firm (ii) the matching firm has existed 
for less than 5 years before the spinoff (iii) the matching firm does not exist for at least as 
long as the spinoff firm and (iv) the matching firm undergoes significant restructuring 
activity. The size cut-offs are in order to obtain a reasonably close match in terms of size 
and the time requirements are in order to ensure that the matching firm is reasonably 
mature. The restructuring requirements are to ensure that the ownership structures of 
these firms are more likely in equilibrium. 
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From all the matches that meet the criteria above I pick the one with historical 
SIC codes (Data324 in Compustat) closest to the corresponding spinoff. If there are 
several matches with the same SIC code, I pick the one closest in size.  For the sample 
transactions prior to 1987 I follow the similar procedure but use CRSP historical SIC 
codes since Compustat does not carry historical SIC codes before 1987. Based on this I 
have 58 4-digit code matches, 19 3-digit code matches, 32 2-digit code matches and 8 1-
digit code matches. The sample characteristics of these matches are discussed in Section 
4 of this chapter. 
3.3 Ownership data 
I collect ownership data from proxy statements filed with the SEC. From each 
statement I obtain the record date, the number of outstanding shares, the number of 
outstanding options that could vest in the next 60 days, the name and number of shares 
held by each block holder of greater than 5%, the holdings of all the officers and directors 
(henceforth managerial ownership) of the firm and the holdings of the CEO. 
 If a firm has more than one class of voting shares I convert the shares into votes. I 
calculate percentages based on the total votes. I do not collect 5% holders of any one 
class if they are not 5% holders of the total votes. Holdings of the CEO and management 
include options whereas those of outside block holders do not. 
In order to record the ownership of the parent before the spinoff I use the last 
proxy statement that is available after the announcement date and before the effective 
date. This is to ensure that the announcement effect of the spinoff is factored into the 
ownership structure. If there is a proxy statement that is associated with the spinoff itself 
I use that. However this is rare and occurs in only 7 out of the 117 transactions. In the 
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majority of the transactions I find that the ownership of the parent firm is available before 
the announcement date and then only after the effective date. It is possible that for such 
firms the inherited ownership structure is altered by the spinoff announcement. However 
to the extent that this happens because of the spinoff (and not due to some other stated 
reason) it is not an issue. 
3.4 Financial information and stock returns 
I use COMPUSTAT for financial information and the CRSP database for stock 
market data. The issue of aligning ownership data with COMPUSTAT information is 
tackled as follows. If the record date and the end of the COMPUSTAT fiscal year are 
within 3 months of each other I link them to create one record.  If the difference is greater 
than 3 months I assign the financial information such that the COMPUSTAT fiscal year 
end comes before the record date. Where possible I check institutional filings to see if the 
block owner has entered the firm at a time after the fiscal year end date. If this is the case, 
I assign the COMPUSTAT fiscal year following the record date. The list of variable 
names is given in Table 0. 
4. Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and ownership structure 
4.1 Firm characteristics 
Table 2, Panel A compares the asset characteristics of the spinoff and the parent 
prior to the spinoff. The median book value of assets (in 2003 constant dollars) of 
spinoffs in year 1 is $588 million and of the parents prior to the spinoff is $ 3035 million. 
Spinoffs are also significantly smaller than parents in terms of market value of equity, 
sales and number of employees. Spinoffs are significantly riskier in terms of idiosyncratic 
risk. Differences in leverage, Q, beta and return-on-assets are not significant. All spinoff 
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and parent firm characteristics listed above, except Q, are pair-wise highly correlated 
(significant at the 1% level) – Q is correlated at the 5% significance level. The lower 
correlation in Q (0.194) is consistent with the fact that not all spinoffs occur because the 
spun-off division is the relatively poor performer. 
Table 2, Panel B reports a similar comparison of the spinoffs and the matching 
firms. Spinoffs have marginally higher sales (t =1.72) and significantly lower beta (t =-
2.00). All other attributes are insignificantly different. Except for beta and leverage all 
firm attributes of the spinoffs and matching sample are correlated at the 1% significance 
level. Leverage is correlated at the 5% level and the correlation in beta is insignificant. 
Overall the correlations show that the spinoffs are reasonably well matched in terms of 
firm attributes to the non-spinoffs. 
4.2 Changes in ownership structure of spinoffs and matching firms 
Table 3 reports measures of the ownership structure of spinoffs for years 1, 2 and 
3. I report 4 measures of ownership structure – block ownership, inside block ownership, 
management ownership and CEO ownership in Panels A, B, C and D respectively. These 
are compared to the corresponding measures of the parent prior to the spinoff (year 0). 
Tests of significance of one, two and three year changes are in the 6 rightmost columns. 
In each panel the ownership structure of the matching firms is reported for years 1, 2 and 
3 below the corresponding measures for the spinoffs. The bottom rows of each panel 
contain test results of the difference between the spinoff and the matching firms.  
Block ownership in the first year of the spinoffs’ existence increases from a mean 
(median) of 20.34% (18.03%) to 24.22% (21.87%). This increase is significant at the 1% 
level. The increase in year 2 of 2.36% is smaller but significant at the 1% level. The 
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change in year 3 is insignificant. The total increase in block ownership over the first three 
years of the spinoffs existence is 7.01% (significant at the 1% level). Spinoffs have 
significantly lower block ownership than the matched firms in year 1 (t = -2.72). This 
difference gets smaller in year 2 (t = -1.59) and is insignificant in year 3 (t = -0.82). The 
matching firms show insignificant changes in ownership during the corresponding 3 year 
period. 
Inside block ownership, defined as the sum of blocks of 5% or more of voting 
rights owned by the officers or directors of the firm, is highly stable in both the spinoff as 
well as the matching sample. Spinoffs have significantly lower inside block ownership 
than the matched sample. This is consistent with the fact that spinoffs are often divisions 
of large parents (often conglomerates) and therefore are less frequently family owned. 
Therefore there is a lower incidence of inside blocks in these firms. The stability of the 
inside blocks indicates that it is unlikely that spinoffs are used as a means of divestiture 
of stakes in the spinoff assets for management of the parent company. Also, the stability 
of inside blocks indicates that much of the increase in block ownership occurs due to 
outside block shareholders. I find that the mean number of block holders in spinoffs in 
year 1, 2 and 3 is 2.49, 2.84 and 2.96 respectively compared to 2.10 block holders in the 
parent prior to the spinoff. The regularity that much of the block holding is due to outside 
block holders is especially important in the context of the emphasis on types of block 
holders in the recent ownership literature. 
Managerial ownership of spinoffs in the first year is significantly lower than that 
of the parent prior to the spinoff (t = -2.19). However it increases significantly in each of 
the subsequent years and by year 3, managerial ownership in spinoffs is insignificantly 
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different from that of the parent prior to the spinoff (t = -0.90). This is consistent with the 
fact that managerial ownership often accumulates via stock option and other performance 
grants which take place in the years after the spinoff shares have been created22. CEO 
ownership shows a similar trend as managerial ownership. However in year 3 spinoffs 
have significantly higher CEO ownership than the parent prior to the spinoff. This is 
likely due to the smaller size of the spinoffs. 
4.3 Serial correlations of ownership structure of spinoffs and matching firms 
Table 4, Panel A reports the cross-sectional correlation between the various 
measures of ownership for the spinoffs and their corresponding parent measures prior to 
the spinoff. Block ownership is the least correlated of the measures with a correlation of 
57.1% in the first year. This reduces to 39.9% in the second year and is 37.9% in year 3. 
Other measures of ownership are more highly correlated and show smaller decreases in 
correlation. This is consistent with the argument that block ownership being a market-
mediated governance mechanism is subject to more rapid change than other measures. 
The high correlation of inside block ownership is consistent with results in the 
previous table which shows zero median changes in insider block ownership. The high 
correlation of managerial ownership warrants further comment - although not a 
dimension of ownership that is replicated during a spinoff, at a level of 82.8% it is 
nevertheless more highly correlated than block ownership. This implies that managerial 
stock ownership patterns in parent firms are closely replicated in spinoffs. The smaller 
fall in correlation is consistent with arguments in the literature that internal governance 
mechanisms change relatively slowly compared to external governance mechanisms. 
                                                 
22 As a result of having more family owned firms in the matching sample the managerial ownership of the 
matching firms is significantly higher than of the spinoffs in all years. CEO ownership shows a similar 
trend as managerial ownership. 
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In Table 4, Panel B the corresponding correlations of the matching firms are all 
higher than for spinoffs and decrease less over time. The correlation between ownership 
measures of spinoffs and matching firms (Table 4, Panel C) are smaller than those 
between the spinoff and parent. Also there is no discernible pattern over time. This is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the correlation should show an increase over time. 
Also, the correlations in measures of ownership between the matching firm and the pre-
spinoff parent (Table 4, Panel D) are mostly higher than those between the spinoffs and 
the matching firms. This is puzzling since the only dimension along which the matching 
firms are more similar to the parent firms than the spinoffs is firm maturity. 
Table 5 reports correlations of block ownership of spinoffs and parents for sub-
groups formed on the basis of industry relatedness. Panel A shows results for subgroups 
formed on the basis of sameness of 2-digit SIC codes and Panels B & C shows results for 
the sample split on the basis of median vertical relatedness and industry complementarity. 
The block ownership of spinoffs has a lower correlation and greater reductions in 
correlation for greater differences in industry i.e. for different SIC codes and lower 
degrees of vertical relatedness and industry complementarity. The exception is year 1 
when 2-digit SIC codes are used – in that case the correlation for different SIC codes is 
0.5791 versus 0.5492 for same SIC codes. The same pattern holds for managerial 
ownership (the exception is in year 3 when the industry complementarity measure is 
used). This is consistent with the argument that greater differences in industry reflect 
greater differences in monitoring requirements and cause a greater movement away from 
the inherited ownership structure. 
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5. Block ownership changes, firm performance and survival 
5.1 Firm characteristics and changes in block ownership 
The focus in this section is on block ownership for two reasons. First, this is the 
dimension of ownership that is replicated and therefore the direct subject of the tests. 
Second, being an external governance mechanism that is more directly determined by 
market forces the likelihood of finding patterns of adaptation is greater. 
In order to examine the determinants of changes in block ownership I first 
perform univariate tests – results are reported in Table 6. I form terciles based on each of 
the firm characteristics used in the hypotheses to predict changes in ownership 
concentration – relative size (Panel A), relative idiosyncratic risk (Panel B), relative Q 
(Panel C), industry relatedness based on stock return correlation (Panel D) and inherited 
ownership (Panel E). In Panel F & Panel G, I form groups based on 2-digit SIC codes & 
survivorship respectively. Finally in Panels H & I results for terciles formed on the basis 
of vertical relatedness and industry complementarity are presented. Each panel reports the 
beginning block ownership and changes measured over the three year horizon for each 
tercile/group. Regression results, where the dependent variable is the three-year change in 
the log of block ownership are in Table 6, Panel J.  
Table 6 Panel A shows that, in the lowest relative size tercile the mean (median) 3 
year change in block ownership is 13.51% (11.11%). In the middle tercile the mean 
(median) change is 6.31% (8.39%). In the highest relative size tercile there is an 
insignificant change in ownership over the 3 year horizon. The difference in the changes 
in the highest and lowest terciles is significant at the 1% level. In a univariate regression 
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(Panel J), consistent with this result the coefficient on relative size is significantly 
negative (t =-3.28)23.  
Table 6, Panel B shows there is an increasing trend in the changes in block 
ownership across terciles formed on the basis of relative idiosyncratic risk. In the lowest 
tercile the mean change is 4.42%, 7.54% in the middle tercile and 9.07% in the largest 
tercile. The difference in the changes between the highest and lowest terciles is 
significant at the 10% level. However the coefficient on relative idiosyncratic risk is 
insignificant in the univariate regression (Panel J). 
Panel C shows a decreasing trend in the changes in block ownership across 
terciles formed based on relative Q. In the lowest relative Q tercile the change in block 
ownership is 13.02%. The change in the middle quartile and the highest quartile are 
5.81% and -1.65%. The difference in the changes between the highest and lowest terciles 
is significant at the 1% level. In a univariate regression (Panel J) the coefficient on 
relative Q is negative and significant (t =-2.23). This is consistent with the argument that 
firms performing poorly, offer greater benefits to increased monitoring and therefore 
have increases in ownership concentration and inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms 
with higher Q should have more concentrated ownership because of a need for greater 
monitoring of firms with more growth options. 
Panel D shows that, ownership changes are negatively related to industry 
relatedness measured by the stock return correlation of the spinoff and the post-spinoff 
parent. In the lowest tercile of relatedness the change in block ownership is 12.22%. In 
the middle tercile the change is 3.02% and in the highest tercile it is 6.18%. The 
                                                 
23 It should also be noted that the beginning level of ownership is increasing across the relative size 
terciles. This has an implication for the multivariate analysis. 
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difference between the changes in the lowest and highest terciles is marginally significant 
and the difference between the lowest and middle tercile is significant at the 1% level. In 
a univariate regression (Panel J) the coefficient on the log of relatedness is significant at 
the 10% level (t =-1.72). 
Panel E shows that firms spun-off from parents in the lowest block ownership 
tercile have an average increase in block ownership of 16.42%. In the middle tercile the 
increase is 8.74% and in the highest tercile there is actually a decrease in block ownership 
of 4.23%. The changes are significantly different from each other at the 1% level. In the 
regressions (Panel J) I use the tercile rank of ownership as the explanatory variable. This 
is in order to avoid a spurious negative correlation with the dependent variable (which, as 
noted above is the change in the log of block ownership). The coefficient is significantly 
negative (t = -5.59). Similar results obtain when prior management ownership is used to 
form the terciles. 
This result presents interesting new evidence on ownership structure. It shows that 
firms tend to preserve their high ownership concentration if they acquire one 
“exogenously” – the increases in block ownership of firms beginning with a diffuse 
ownership are much higher (16.42%) than the decreases in block ownership of firms 
beginning with a concentrated ownership (a decrease of only 4.23%).  Further the 
decrease of 4.23% is not as significant considering that the beginning block ownership of 
these firms is close to 40%. This evidence is consistent with the notion that block 
formation is costly and therefore blocks are self-preserving. Also it suggests that though 
diffusion in ownership structure could be beneficial, “freely available” concentrations in 
ownership are beneficial to the firm. 
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Panel F shows that spinoffs with the same 1 digit SIC code as the parent have a 
change in block ownership of 5.59% compared to 8.50% for those with different 1 digit 
SIC codes. In a univariate regression (Panel J) this difference is significant at the 10% 
level (t =-1.82).  
In Panel G, the mean change in block ownership of the surviving spinoffs is 
8.72% and that for non-survivors is 2.82%. The difference is significant at the 1% level. 
In a univariate regression (Panel J) the coefficient on the survivorship dummy is 
insignificant at traditional levels of significance. However, the results in the multivariate 
analysis differ (discussed below). 
Panels H & I report results for terciles formed on the basis of vertical relatedness 
and industry complementarity. The results show that for spinoffs with greater vertical 
relatedness and industry complementarity with the parent the changes in block ownership 
are larger. In the case of vertical relatedness the change in the highest tercile of 
relatedness is 9.8% and in the lowest tercile is 5.4% (difference significant at 1% level) 
and in the case of industry complementarity the changes are 11.9% and 6.1% (difference 
significant at 1% level). In a univariate regression both measures of industry similarity 
are significant at the 1% with coefficients of -0.0717 (t = -2.24) and -0.0223 (t = -2.29).  
The last two columns in Panel J show multivariate analyses of changes in 
ownership. Prior ownership remains highly significant. The coefficients on relative size 
and relative Q reduce in magnitude and the significance is lowered to the 10% level. This 
is probably due to relative size and relative risk being correlated to the beginning level of 
block ownership (refer footnote 19). Survivorship becomes significant at the 10% level. 
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Vertical relatedness remains significant and relative idiosyncratic risk remains 
insignificant.  
A comparison of the adjusted R-square shows that prior ownership and relative 
size have substantially larger explanatory power than other variables – 23% and 8% 
respectively. Relative Q has an adjusted R-square of 3% and stock return correlation, 2%. 
In the multivariate specifications adjusted R-square is 26% and 28%. This compares 
favorably to the adjusted R-squared of 40% reported by Himmelberg et al (1999, in the 
cross-sectional specification) and 35% reported by Demsetz & Lehn (1985) for analyses 
of the level of block ownership. The comparable adjusted R-square for changes in block 
ownership is a direct demonstration that changes in ownership structure are determined to 
a significant degree by firm characteristics used in the literature as proxies for the 
monitoring requirements of firms. 
Table 7, Panel A, presents regression models of the log of block ownership of the 
spinoff (year 1) and the pre-spinoff parent. I also report corresponding results for the 
matching firms. The manner and extent to which block ownership is explained by firm 
characteristics is similar for the spinoff and parent firms. Block ownership is significantly 
negatively related to firm size (market value of equity) and significantly positively related 
to idiosyncratic risk. For both parents and spinoffs, asset tangibility (measured by the 
PPE ratio), Q and the extent of capital expenditures are not significantly related to block 
ownership. In both models the management dummy is positive and significant. This is a 
dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the officers and directors of the firm own more than 
25% of the voting rights of the firm. This dummy is included in order to explain what 
might otherwise be construed as abnormally high block ownership. 
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The extent to which leverage and survivorship are related to block ownership 
differs significantly for spinoffs and parent firms. For spinoffs, unlike the parents, 
leverage is significantly positively associated with the extent of block ownership. For 
spinoffs the survivorship dummy enters the model with a positive coefficient that is 
significant at the 10% level. The lack of a similar association for the relatively mature 
parent firms is not surprising. This is consistent with the argument that block owners are 
not making bets based on the expected survival of these mature firms. The adjusted R-
square for the parent firms is uniformly higher than for the spinoffs.  
Since the spinoffs are significantly smaller than their parents and in different 
industries the matching firms provide a more appropriate benchmark for comparing 
ownership structure. Results are in Table 7 Panel A. Like for spinoffs, block ownership 
of the matching firms is significantly negatively associated with firm size and positively 
associated with leverage. However, for the matching firms there is no positive association 
between block ownership and idiosyncratic risk and there is a significant positive 
association with Q. Like in the case of the parent firms the eventual survival of the 
matching firms is not a significant determinant of block ownership.  
I find that firm characteristics explain block ownership to a higher degree for the 
spinoffs (adjusted R-square of 18%) than for the matching firms (adjusted R-square of 
12%). However, when Q and block ownership are estimated simultaneously (discussed 
later in this section), this result changes. 
Finally, I check the extent to which variation in the inherited block ownership i.e. 
the block ownership of the parent prior to the spinoff is explained by the characteristics 
of the spinoff firm. Except for idiosyncratic risk all firm attributes are insignificant in 
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explaining the prior block ownership. The significantly low(er) adjusted R-square of 7% 
suggests the extent to which the inherited block ownership is “inappropriate” for the 
spinoffs firm characteristics. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the fit between ownership structure and firm 
characteristics improves with time, in Table 7, Panel B I present regression models of 
block ownership of spinoffs and matching firms for the first three years of the spinoffs’ 
existence. Inconsistent with the hypothesis, there is no improvement in fit or significance 
of the explanatory variables. For the spinoff sample this could be due to high and 
divergent growth rates in the sample. However a similar trend for the matching firms 
suggests that this could be an industry phenomenon. Spinoff transactions cluster in 
industries that are experiencing technology or demand shocks. It is possible that for firms 
in such industries the fit between ownership concentration and firm characteristics 
worsens. However the declining trend in the adjusted R-square for the matching firms 
disappears when Q is endogenized. 
One interesting result in Table 7 Panel B is that the significance of survivorship 
increases over time from 0.0356 (t = 1.72) in year 0 to 0.0855 (t = 3.42) in year 3. This is 
consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium in which block owners make bets 
based on the expectations of eventual survival. 
When lagged ownership is added to the model, for spinoffs the coefficient 
diminishes in magnitude and significance as we go forward in time. In year 1 the 
coefficient is 0.36 (t =5.01), in year 2 it is 0.10 (t = 1.38) and in year 3 it is 0.057 (t 
=0.61). By contrast coefficients of lagged ownership for the matching firms remain large 
and significant, 0.80 in year 2 (t =12.32) and 0.71 in year 3 (t =10.11). Also unlike 
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spinoffs, in the case of matching firms, when lagged ownership is added all other 
variables are rendered insignificant and the adjusted R-square increases to the 70% level. 
Consistent with the correlation results presented earlier, these results show that ownership 
changes substantially less over time for the matching firms than for the spinoffs. 
5.2 Difference in block ownership of spinoffs and matching firms 
 To test the hypotheses regarding the differences in block ownership of spinoffs 
and matching firms I run regressions of the difference in log of block ownership on 
corresponding differences in firm characteristics. Results are in Table 7 Panel C. In the 
first year only the difference in leverage is significantly related to the difference in log of 
block ownership. Differences in all other firm characteristics are insignificant. In the 
second year differences in firm size, idiosyncratic risk and the ratio of property, plant and 
equipment to assets are significant at the 10% level or better. The adjusted r-square jumps 
from 2.61% to 7.68%. In year 3 additionally the difference in the market-to-book ratio of 
assets and the long run survival of the company are also significant at the 10% level. 
 In a specification that includes the differences in a management dummy (variable 
that takes a value of 1 if management owns more that 25% of the firm) the variable is 
highly significant and renders most other variables insignificant. Also, the adjusted r-
squared jumps to over 50%. Overall, the results suggest that the differences in ownership 
relative to the matching firms are more systematically linked to the differences in firm 
characteristics as the spinoffs season. 
5.3 Ownership structure, firm performance and survival 
The evidence to this stage clearly shows that there are significant changes in the 
ownership structure of spinoffs. The evidence also suggests that these changes occur in 
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ways that are consistent with efficiencies in monitoring. In order to examine the impact 
of changes in block ownership on firm value, I examine the effect of past changes in 
block ownership on firm survival and stock valuations24,25. Since the market-to-book 
ratio of the spinoff firm is also a reflection of the history of the firm as a subsidiary I 
examine changes in the ratio rather than the level of the ratio. Results are in Panels A 
(firm survival) and B (changes in stock valuation) of Table 8. 
For firm survival, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm’s delisting 
code in the CRSP database as of December, 2003 is 100. I use the changes in block 
ownership over a 1, 2 and 3 year period to predict the eventual survival of the firm. In 
addition to the changes in block ownership, I include firm size and the level of block 
ownership. All else equal, the chances of liquidation and the ease of acquisition of a firm 
are lower the larger the firm. Also, all else equal, it is likely that acquiring a firm with 
highly concentrated ownership could be more difficult. I also include accounting and 
stock performance measures because poorly performing firms may be acquired or 
liquidated with greater probability. Finally I include idiosyncratic risk (also in log form) 
as a control variable. 
I find that the changes in block ownership over a 2 and 3 year period are 
significant in explaining the eventual survival of spinoffs (p-values of 0.04 and 0.01). 
That the change in block ownership in year 1 is insignificant is not surprising given 
earlier results that show that block ownership continues to show significant average 
                                                 
24 The existing literature on ownership offers few links between operating performance of firms and their 
ownership structure. Also, the existing literature on spinoffs suggests little change in the operating 
performance of these firms post-spinoff. 
25 I find no association between changes in block ownership and operating performance. Results available 
upon request from the author. 
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changes in year 2 (only about 60% of the three year change occurs in year 1) and has 
likely not reached a steady state.  
Also the coefficient on the level of inherited block ownership is significant in 
years 1 and 2. It should be noted that all the firms are in the sample in all three years and 
therefore the growing significance of the block ownership variables is not a spurious 
result driven by selective survival. The coefficient on firm size is positive and significant 
in all three years and is not a surprising result. The adjusted percentage of deviation 
explained increases from 2.10% in year 1 to 7.50% in year 3 and can be mainly attributed 
to the increase in significance of the block ownership variables. 
In Panel B of Table 8 I examine changes in the market-to-book ratio of spinoffs. 
Since the market-to-book ratio is available at the end of the first year of the spinoff firm 
these tests are constrained to years 2 and 3. In addition to the block ownership variables I 
include firm size, idiosyncratic risk and measures of accounting performance as control 
variables. The results show that changes in block ownership over the 2 and 3 year period 
are positively associated with changes in Q. However, the significance is marginal (T-
stats of 1.57 and 1.69 respectively). The adjusted R-square of the model is low and of the 
control variables only the log of idiosyncratic risk is significant. 
In Panel C of Table 8 I examine the log market-to-book ratio of the spinoff firm 
minus the log market-to-book ratio of the matching firm. As in the earlier regressions I 
include the following firm characteristics as control variables – firm size, idiosyncratic 
risk, ratio of capital expenditure to assets, ratio of property, plant and equipment to assets 
and block ownership. All variables enter as the difference of the log transforms. The 
difference in log of block ownership has a coefficient of 0.0673 and is insignificant in 
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year 1. In year 2 the coefficient jumps to 0.2597 and is significant at the 10% level. In 
year 3 the coefficient is 0.4264 and is significant at the 1% level. The results clearly 
demonstrate that as the spinoffs season and get closer to their equilibrium ownership 
structure the differences between spinoffs and benchmark firms in valuation are more 
systematically and significantly related to differences in ownership structure. The 
difference in firm size, idiosyncratic risk and capital expenditure ratios are significantly 
positive and the PPE ratio is insignificant. 
The results above show that changes in the block ownership of spinoffs are 
positively associated with the likelihood of survival and the changes in the market-to-
book ratio. However, these results do not provide any evidence on the level of the 
market-to-book ratio which is the traditional performance metric in the ownership 
literature. Therefore, following the literature I use a simultaneous equation framework 
that jointly estimates Q and the level of ownership. Results in an earlier sub-section show 
that Q of the spinoffs measured relative to the parents is a significant explanatory factor 
of subsequent changes in block ownership. Panel D of Table 8 shows the changes in 
block ownership of terciles formed on the basis of Q of the spinoffs in the first year (i.e. 
not measured relative to the parent). The decreasing trend shows that in addition to 
relative Q, raw Q is also a significant explanatory factor of three-year changes in block 
ownership. This clearly establishes the need for simultaneous estimation of the relation 
between Q and block ownership of spinoffs. I run similar models for the matching firms 
and compare the results to those of the spinoffs. 
When the dependent variable is log of block ownership, the independent variables 
include the log of firm size (market value of equity), idiosyncratic risk, log of Q (the 
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market-to-book of assets), log of the ratio of capital expenditure to assets, log of the PPE 
ratio, log of book leverage and  the management dummy. For the Q equation in addition 
to block ownership I include firm size (measured by sales), operating performance and 
idiosyncratic risk as explanatory variables. Following Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) I use sales as a proxy for firm size. This is in order to avoid a spurious correlation 
that could arise if the book value of assets or the market value of equity (or assets) is 
used. Results are in Table 9. 
The results show that in the Q equation the coefficient on block ownership of 
spinoff firms is negative in years 1, 2 and 3 but significant only in year 1. The magnitude 
of the coefficient decreases sharply from -1.3 to -0.46. Combined with the earlier results 
on the changes in Q this shows that block ownership of spinoffs adjusts so that as Q is 
marginally improved the relation between the level of Q and block ownership becomes 
insignificant over time. For the matching firms the corresponding coefficient is positive 
and insignificant and also shows a sharp fall in magnitude (from 0.51 in year 1 to -.14 in 
year 3). For the matching firms, the results are similar to earlier results documented in the 
literature of an insignificant association between ownership structure and firm 
performance in a simultaneous equation framework (Himmelberg et al 1999 and Demsetz 
& Villalonga 2001). Also for the matching firms the adjusted R-square of the block 
ownership equation improves from the 20% level to the 40% level and does not show the 
earlier decline observed in the OLS specifications. 
6. Robustness and additional tests 
6.1 Industry relatedness 
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The first test is with respect to the measures of industry relatedness. Table 10 tests 
the difference in industry relatedness between spinoffs with the same and different 1, 2 
and 3-digit SIC codes as the parent. Panel A presents summary statistics of vertical 
relatedness and industry complementarity and Panel B tests the differences. Industry 
complementarity is significantly higher for same SIC code pairs than different SIC code 
pairs at all levels of the code (p-value = 1%). In the case of vertical relatedness the 
difference is significant at the 5% level for 2 and 4 digit codes and at the 10% level for 
the 3-digit code. 
6.2 Share turnover 
In the tests discussed in Section 5 I use the last recorded ownership structure of the parent 
firm as a proxy for the inherited ownership structure of the spinoff. Therefore it is not 
clear to what extent post-spinoff-announcement trading changes this inherited ownership 
structure. Specifically, there may be intensive trading between the record date and the 
effective date of the spinoff. In order the estimate the potential effect of this trading I 
record the parent firm’s share turnover in the 1026 trading days (record period turnover) 
immediately prior to the first day of trading of the spinoff shares and relate it to the 
changes in block ownership. 
 Table 11 Panel A reports summary statistics for record period turnover. Panel A 
also reports the ratio of the record period turnover to the turnover in the 10 day period 
immediately preceding it (called abnormal record period turnover). The average (median) 
ratio is 1.327 (1.172) and is significantly greater than 1 at the 1% level. . Table 11 Panel 
B reports regression results of changes in block ownership of spinoffs in the first year on 
                                                 
26 The average duration of the period between record date and effective date is 15 days which translates 
into 10 trading days. 
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record period turnover, abnormal period turnover and control variables. Record period 
turnover is negative and marginally significant (t =-1.54). Abnormal record period 
turnover is negative and significant (t =-2.52). The negative sign is surprising since it 
suggests that the greater the abnormal record period turnover the smaller the subsequent 
changes in block ownership. When used jointly abnormal period turnover remains 
negative and significant. When used with other control variables both measures of 
turnover are insignificant and the adjusted r-square drops from 27.88% to 25.85%. 
Overall the results suggest that trading during the record period is not a likely driver of 
the results. 
6.3Piece-wise linear regression model of market-to-book on block ownership 
Morck et al (1989) find a piece-wise non-linear relation between the Tobin’s Q 
and managerial ownership for a sample of large firms. They offer the argument that at 
low levels (0-5%) of managerial ownership increases in ownership enhance firm 
performance. In an intermediate range (5-25%) increases in managerial ownership cause 
entrenchment and at very high levels (>25%) the incentive effects outweigh the 
entrenchment effects. In order to check the potential evolution of a piece-wise linear 
relation between block ownership and market-to-book ratio of spinoffs I replicate their 
analysis. Descriptive statistics are in Table 12 Panel A and regression results are in Panel 
B (using block ownership) and Panel C (using managerial ownership). The table clearly 
shows neither a pre-existing pattern nor the evolution of a pattern similar to the one found 
by Morck et al. When the piece-wise linear ownership variables are added, none of them 
enters significantly and the adjusted r-squared falls sharply. 
6.4. Survival 
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Survival defined as of a particular date (in this case Dec 31, 2003) treats earlier 
transactions differently from later transactions. In order to account for this effect I 
redefine survival as existence for a period of 3, 4 and 5 years after the transactions. 
Longer horizons are precluded due to a drop in sample size (for example a period of 10 
years eliminates all transactions after 1993). The results are qualitatively similar – 
although the magnitude of the coefficient on the change in block ownership is lower the 
significance levels are comparable. 
6.5 Abnormal returns 
 In the tests so far I use Q as the performance measure. The theory that uses Q as a 
performance measure bases its hypotheses on marginal Q. I use changes in Q as a proxy 
for marginal Q. Another potential measure is the abnormal stock performance. I first 
document the cumulative abnormal returns for three value-weighted portfolios formed on 
the basis of long-run survival of the spinoff – survivors, targets and delisted firms. The 
results are in Figure 2A. The results show that the surviving sample outperforms the other 
two samples in the first three years of the spinoffs’ existence. Next, in Figure 2B I 
document abnormal returns for terciles of value-weighted spinoffs formed on the basis of 
changes in 1 year block ownership. Cumulative abnormal returns for the corresponding 
matching firms are also plotted. Spinoff 1 is for the biggest increase in block ownership 
and Spinoff 3 for the smallest. Match 1 plots matching firms CARs corresponding to the 
Spinoff 1 sample etc. As can be seen the only significant difference in performance is for 
the tercile with the largest changes in block ownership. At the end of 3 years the spinoff 
sample has a CAR of 57% compared to 27% for the matching firms.  
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In order to examine the abnormal stock performance of the stocks I form tercile 
portfolios based on 1 year changes in block ownership. The portfolios are value-weighted 
(using the market value of equity) and are long on the spinoff firm and short on the 
corresponding matching firm. I measure the alpha of each portfolio using a Fama-French 
3 factor model. I find that the alpha of the portfolio with the largest changes in ownership 
is significant (t = 1.88) and the alphas of the remaining portfolios is insignificant. This 
lends support to the earlier results that changes in block ownership are positively 
associated with changes in Q27. 
6.6 Simultaneous estimation of Q and block ownership 
 Finally, for the simultaneous estimation of Q and block ownership I use a 
specification where all variables except firm size are in raw form instead of the log 
transforms. The results for the block ownership variable remain qualitatively similar.  
7. Conclusions and future research 
Unlike previous studies of ownership structure, I identify a setting in which the 
ownership structure of firms is expected to change significantly. For a set of newly spun-
off firms, block ownership and managerial ownership change significantly and rapidly. 
Block ownership increases by 7 percentage points in the first 3 years of the spinoffs’ 
existence. This increase occurs in a series of changes that get successively smaller. 
Managerial ownership of spinoffs also increases significantly from beginning levels and 
by the end of the third year is not significantly different from the managerial ownership 
of the parent firm. These changes are significant and larger than the corresponding 
changes in comparable non-spinoffs. All measures of ownership structure of the matching 
firms show little time-series variation. 
                                                 
27 Results available upon request from author. 
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The size and market-to-book ratio of the spinoff firm measured relative to the 
parent, measures of industry and stock return relatedness, the eventual survival of the 
spinoff firm and the inherited ownership structure are significant determinants of changes 
in block ownership of spinoffs. Prior block ownership is negatively related to future 
increase in block ownership. Similarly the difference in firm characteristics of spinoffs 
and matching firms are more systematically and significantly related to corresponding 
differences in block ownership as the spinoffs season. The evidence regarding the 
changes in block ownership is consistent with the view that ownership structure adapts to 
changes in the nature of the firm. Regression analysis shows that the amount of variation 
of block ownership of spinoffs explained by firm characteristics is similar to comparable 
non-spinoffs.  
I find that changes in block ownership are positively associated with the 
probability of survival and changes in Q. The difference in block ownership of spinoffs 
and matching firms is increasingly positively associated with the difference in market-to-
book ratios as the spinoffs season. These results suggest that block holders either enhance 
firm value or possess superior stock picking skills. Alternatively it could be an artifact of 
high-Q firms requiring greater monitoring via more concentrated ownership structures. In 
a simultaneous equation framework where the relation between Q and block ownership of 
spinoffs is estimated jointly, block ownership affects the market-to-book ratio negatively. 
However, this relation is significant only in the first year. This is consistent with results 
in the literature regarding ownership and firm performance of mature firms – as spinoffs 
season they mimic the behavior of mature firms more closely. 
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The results have the following implications. First, the results constitute scarce 
new evidence of significant changes in ownership structure. Most previous studies focus 
on a static examination of ownership structure since it changes slowly through time. The 
evidence in this paper regarding the determinants of changes in ownership structure 
provides a glimpse of how ownership structure evolves in response to changes in the 
nature of the firm. The experiment is strengthened by the relative exogeneity of the 
spinoff decision to ownership structure.  Second, the evidence has important implications 
for the time dependency of ownership structure. Though widely cited in the literature 
there is little systematic evidence of this aspect of ownership structure. A significant 
portion of the sample firms inherits a highly concentrated ownership structure and on 
average retains this structure. This is in stark contrast to those firms which inherit a 
diffuse ownership structure. While showing that the existing ownership structure affects 
future changes in ownership structure this also shows that, absent significant costs, more 
concentrated ownership structures are more efficient and are therefore retained. Third, the 
results on survival and performance constitute direct evidence that the ownership 
structure of firms can potentially play a significant role in the survival of the firm and its 
financial performance. 
 This paper uses summary measures of block holdings and abstracts from the 
issue of investor type. However, there is a growing literature that reflects the importance 
of type of investor. A dimension of ownership structure unexplored in this study is the 
type of investors in spinoffs. What types of new investors take up stakes in the firm? 
What types of investors tend to stay over from the parent firm and what type exit? How 
does this relate to firm characteristics? How does the rate of turnover of different types of 
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block holders in spinoffs compare to that in a set of matching mature firms? Do any of 
these aspects of ownership structure incrementally impact the performance of these firms 
or their survival? 
A natural extension of the sample of this paper is to two-stage spinoffs, equity 
carve-outs and tracking stocks. Are the changes in ownership structure of carve-out firms 
different from those documented in this paper? The results regarding prior ownership 
structure suggest that there would be significant differences. Performance comparisons 
show that carve-outs perform better than spinoffs (Michaely & Shaw 1995). Is this 
difference related to ownership structure and the retention of control by the parent? 
Another closely related topic is the examination of the changes in ownership 
structure of the parent firms around spinoffs. Exploratory findings in this direction 
suggest that the changes in the block ownership of parent firms are significantly smaller 
than those of the spinoffs. However spinoffs of large relative size and importance would 
reveal more interesting results. 
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Chapter 328
1. Introduction 
 Notwithstanding the extensive literature on firm governance and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) there has been little positive inquiry into the formation of corporate 
boards around mergers. Recent literature on corporate boards reflects increased interest of 
scholars to study boards in a positive light. Boone, Field, Karpoff & Raheja (2004), Lehn, 
Patro & Zhao (2004) and Yang, Linck & Netter (2004) are some recent studies that 
examine the variation in board size and composition. However, these and similar studies 
do not examine the effect of mergers on the board structure of acquiring firms.  
Our proposition is that the changes occurring in the board structure of the 
acquiring firm around a merger reflect systematic choices related to the effective 
monitoring of the combination of target and acquirer firm assets. Based on this premise 
we examine changes in the board structure of acquiring firms and test hypotheses 
regarding the determinants of these changes. 
 When firms merge, changes in firm size, asset mix and market strategies change 
the magnitude and nature of the agency problems that are the raison d’etre of corporate 
boards. The acquiring firm’s reliance on the directors of the target firm (or other new 
directors) to address the changes in the scope and intensity of their monitoring task 
depends on the efficacy of the target board relative to the acquirer board and the 
competence and monitoring incentives of the individual directors of both firms. 
 Using a sample of 141 mergers in the banking industry during the period 1995-
2000 we test hypotheses that relate the asset characteristics, firm performance, board 
structure and managerial ownership of the target and acquirer firm, to three dimensions of 
                                                 
28 This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Kenneth Lehn and Prof. Gershon Mandelker. 
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the survivor board29. These include the size of the survivor board, the probability that at 
least one target director is hired (henceforth probability of representation) and the number 
of target directors hired (henceforth extent of representation) on the survivor board30
 We focus on a single industry to build homogeneity in the nature of merger 
transactions as well as in the governance characteristics of the sample firms. Mitchell & 
Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2204) document significant industry-clustering in M&A 
activity. The variation in the reasons that underlie M&A clustering could potentially 
affect the ways in which boards change around mergers. At the same time, Gillan, 
Hartzell & Starks (2003) find that industry factors contribute to about half the variation in 
board structure. By focusing on mergers within a single industry we abstract from these 
effects and the complexities associated with them.  
 The banking industry is well-suited to this study for several reasons. First, the 
banking industry is a large and important part of capital and product markets. Second, in 
the 1990s M&A activity in the banking industry was extensive, enabling us to limit our 
study to a single industry31. Finally, there is a large literature that exclusively examines 
the governance of banks and mergers in the banking industry. Few other industries have 
received as much individual focus in the M&A and governance literature. 
Our analysis yields the following results. The board size of the acquirer increases 
by an average of 14% and changes in composition are insignificant. After controlling for 
pre-merger board size, the board size of the acquirer post-merger is positively related to 
                                                 
29 We use the phrase ‘post-merger acquirer firm’ and survivor interchangeably. 
30 The probability of representation is 1 if there is at least one target director on the survivor board, 0 
otherwise. The extent of representation is the number of target directors on the survivor board. 
31 M&A activity in the banking sector is discussed in the next section. 
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the size, market-to-book and accounting performance of the target firm measured relative 
to the acquirer and the mean age of the target directors.  
On average 1.8 target directors are hired to the survivor board and there is 
significant variation in this number. In 60% of the transactions there is at least one target 
firm director on the survivor board and in 40% of the transactions the target CEO is 
hired. Consistent with the existence of efficiencies in monitoring, we find that the firm 
size, accounting performance and market-to-book ratio of the target measured relative to 
the acquirer significantly explain the probability of representation and the extent of 
representation of target directors on the survivor board. Also, we find that the correlation 
of stock returns of target and acquirer is significantly negatively related to the probability 
of representation and the extent of representation of target directors on the survivor 
board. 
 In a logit model the target firm’s board size does not influence the probability of 
representation after controlling for the firm characteristics mentioned above. This is 
consistent with the argument that the target board does not represent a default extension 
of the market for directors from which survivor board seats may be filled. However, the 
target board size is significantly positively related to the extent of representation of target 
directors on the board of the merged firm.  This suggests that if the target firm board 
passes the bar and is therefore considered a part of the labor market from which directors 
are chosen, then ceteris paribus, the bigger the target board the larger the number chosen 
as part of the survivor board. After controlling for the firm characteristics mentioned 
above the composition of the target and acquirer boards and the geographical separation 
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of the target and acquirer do not influence either the probability or extent of 
representation. 
 We use the ownership stake and age of the directors as proxies for monitoring 
incentives and competence. We find that after controlling for other firm and board 
characteristics, the ownership stake of the target CEO is not related to the probability and 
extent of representation of the target directors on the survivor board. The ownership stake 
of the remaining officers and directors of the target firm is unrelated to the probability but 
significantly negatively related to the extent of representation of the target directors on 
the survivor board. The last result is puzzling and may be caused due to these members of 
the target board cashing their stakes at the time of the merger32.  The mean and median 
age of the directors has no explanatory power. 
 The results are robust to sub-sampling based on the relative size of the target and 
are also robust to different methods for handling multiple acquisitions by the same 
acquirer. Combined with the high explanatory power, (adjusted R-square of 70% for the 
number of directors hired and adjusted percentage deviation explained of 40% for the 
probability that at least one director is hired) the results support our proposition that 
board formation around mergers reflects systematic choices related to efficiencies in 
monitoring. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss 
boards of banks, M&A activity in the banking industry and develop hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the sample formation and data collection steps. Section 4 presents empirical 
results. Section 5 provides concluding comments. 
                                                 
32 It is hard to test whether the sale of stake is simple due to the merger or due to not being hired as a 
survivor director. 
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2. Corporate boards and M&A in the banking industry 
2.1 Boards of banking firms 
Although the mandate of a bank’s board is the same as that of a manufacturing 
firm, the task of a bank’s board is arguably different due to the specific nature of banking 
activity. Morgan (2002) argues that the assets of banks are more opaque than those of 
manufacturing firms. On the one hand this may be caused due to lending to opaque 
borrowers – by definition banks in their role of intermediaries are supposed to lend to 
borrowers who need greater screening and monitoring (Diamond 1983). On the other 
hand the trading positions of banks are hard to monitor because the highly liquid nature 
of the assets makes the positions easily changeable (Morgan, 2002). Morgan (2002) finds 
support for the opacity argument in the greater disagreement between rating agencies 
regarding bank debt and the systematically lopsided nature of bank debt ratings. 
Flannery (1994) and Morgan (2002) argue that the traditionally high leverage of 
banks could lead to significant asset and risk substitution problems (Galai & Masulis 
(1976), Jensen & Meckling (1976).This is especially true given the existence of a 
significant fraction of liquid trading assets in a bank’s portfolio. The combination of 
opacity of assets and high leverage can create greater potential for agency conflict in 
banks compared to the average manufacturing firm. This could mean that the board of a 
banking firm has a more difficult governance role than a non-financial firm. 
Booth Cornett & Tehranian (2002) argue that the greater regulation of banks may 
act as a substitute monitoring mechanism. They interpret the relatively weaker 
correlations (compared to non-financial firms) among different governance mechanisms 
of banks as evidence consistent with this hypothesis. On the other hand it is well-
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accepted that there are greater costs to market discipline of banks compared to non-
financial firms (Prowse (1997), Morgan (2002), Adams & Mehran (2003)). These authors 
argue that it is regulation which increases the costs of market discipline of banking firms 
relative to firms in non-regulated industries. Given the recent interest in deregulating the 
banking industry the efficacy of regulation as a substitute for market discipline is not 
without question. Given the focus on bank boards in the literature and its content we find 
little reason to believe that the boards of banks serve a function any less important than 
the boards of non-financial firms. 
In comparing the governance of banks and manufacturing firms Booth, Cornett & 
Tehranian (2002) and Adams & Mehran (2003) find that bank boards are larger and more 
independent. Adams & Merhan (2003) offer the explanation that the number of parties 
with a stake in a bank’s activities could complicate governance in a way that leads to 
larger boards. 
In a study of firm performance Adams & Mehran (2002) find that, similar to non-
financial firms (Hermalin & Weisbach (1991), Klein (1998), Bhagat & Black (2000)) the 
composition of bank boards is unrelated to measures of accounting performance and the 
market-to-book ratio. However, contrary to Yermack’s results (1996) they find that the 
size of bank boards is positively related to the market-to-book ratio. Belkhir (2004) finds 
a similar result. 
Adams & Mehran (2002) offer the suggestion that, given their empirical findings, 
limiting the board size of banks may prove counterproductive. Belkhir (2004) argues that 
the observed relation may be spuriously caused by increases in board size around 
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mergers33. However, Adams & Mehran (2002) point to a decreasing trend in board size in 
the 1990s as being inconsistent with Belkhir’s (2004) conclusion.  
2.2 M&A activity in the banking industry 
 In their study of M&A in the banking industry during the 1990s Becher & 
Campbell (2004) find that in the first half of the decade bank mergers were facilitated by 
reciprocal banking agreements (regional compacts) between states. In 1994 Congress 
passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act which 
essentially allowed banks to acquire out-of-state banks and to branch into other states 
without the permission of the host state. Becher & Campbell (2004) argue that this 
deregulation was the driving force behind the mergers in the second half of the 1990s. 
Houston, James & Ryngaert (2001) study a sample of large bank mergers (mega-
mergers) from 1985-96. They find that mega-mergers during their sample period were 
associated with significantly positive wealth effects, attributable mainly to cost savings.  
Becher & Campbell (2004) confirm the results of Houston et al for the first half of the 
1990s. In addition they find that mergers in the second half of the 1990s are significantly 
value-decreasing. The distinguishing factor between these two periods is the degree of 
branch overlap with mergers in the second half of the 1990s having a lower degree of 
overlap and therefore lower cost savings. Berger, Demsetz & Strahan (1999) provide a 
detailed survey of the literature that examines gains from banking mergers. Overall, the 
results suggest that the sources of gains in banking mergers are as varied and hard to 
identify as in mergers of non-financial firms. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Belkhir finds an average increase of 2 directors for a doubling in firm size. 
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2.3 Hypotheses  
For a merger to be productive there must be effective integration of the merging 
entities. The degree of integration necessary may vary depending on the motivation for 
the merger and the size of the merging entities – for example realizing operational 
synergies or merging operations of large relative size arguably requires more careful 
integration than realizing gains from market power or merging operations of small 
relative size. The more difficult it is to integrate the merging entities, the more crucial the 
monitoring and advisory role of the board.  
We hypothesize that a rational response to a greater monitoring and advisory role 
is a more ‘co-operative’ board i.e. with greater participation of target directors on the 
board of the merged firm. This is because a co-operative board would have a broader 
spectrum of expertise that better covers both acquirer and target assets. We use relative 
size, the relative market-to-book ratio and the correlation in stock returns of acquirer and 
target to capture complexities in the effective integration of the merging entities. 
Additional measures of the complexity in integration that are of particular interest  
in commercial banking operations are the geographical separation of branch operations 
(Houston, James & Ryngaert 2001) and the composition of assets. In order to capture the 
geographical dispersion we check if both target and acquirer are in the same state or 
different states. To capture differences in asset composition we calculate distance 
measures based on the ratio of loans to total assets and the composition of loans into three 
categories – loans to individuals, industrial loans and real estate loans. 
 Although we hypothesize that a more co-operative board is desirable for a 
smoother transition around complex mergers this is not without a caveat. If the target 
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directors are of relatively poor quality then the optimal response may be to increase the 
acquirer’s board size via directorial talent from the labor market. For example this could 
be true of a merger where the main motivation is disciplining the target management 
team. Our primary measures of the quality of the target board are firm performance and 
the ownership stakes of the board members. Firm performance reflects the competence of 
the target board and the ownership stake reflects (at least on an ex-ante basis) the 
incentives of the target directors.  
3. Sample 
 Using the SDC Platinum database we form an initial sample of all mergers with 
announcement dates during the period 1995 through 2000. We use the CUSIP identifier 
to link the sample firms in SDC to the CRSP database. In order to restrict the sample to 
the commercial banking sector we select only those transactions where both the target 
and the acquirer have a CRSP 2-digit SIC code of 60 at the time of the merger. This 
yields a total of 518 transactions. We match the names of the acquirer and the target in 
SDC to the names in CRSP to ensure that the sample firms are correctly identified.  
Because we need stock returns and accounting information we require the target 
and the acquirer bank to be listed in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT. This requirement 
eliminates 233 transactions. For the remaining 285 mergers we read news stories on 
Factiva to ensure that the acquirer and target are properly matched and that the deal was 
completed. We drop two transactions because there are no news stories available on 
Factiva and one because it was later cancelled. Four transactions are dropped because the 
target bank is listed multiple times in the SDC Database with different acquirer names 
and information on Factiva and CRSP is inadequate to correctly identify the merger. Two 
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transactions are dropped because the target was a subsidiary of the acquirer. Two 
transactions are dropped because the acquirer is delisted from the CRSP database before 
the target and three are dropped because the SDC merger announcement date is later than 
the CRSP delisting date for the target. Thus a total of 14 transactions are dropped. This 
leaves a total of 271 transactions for which news stories and CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
information are available. 
We collect data on the board of directors from electronic proxy statements 
available in the Lexis-Nexis database. For each merger we require that a proxy statement 
be available no more than 1 year before the effective date of the merger for both acquirer 
and target and no more than 1 year after the effective date for the acquirer. This 
requirement is imposed in order to capture board characteristics before and after the 
merger as accurately as possible. A longer window increases the likelihood of other 
events that may affect board structure. As a result of imposing this requirement we are 
left with a final sample of 141 mergers. Table 13 reports the year-wise distribution of the 
sample of mergers. 
From each proxy statement we collect the name, age, tenure, ownership and 
committee membership of each director and the total ownership of the board members.  
From the post-merger proxy statement of the acquirer we identify directors who come 
from the target firm and new additions to the acquirer board. We identify the CEO and 
chairman of the company and have a variable to indicate if the two are separate. We 
classify directors from each of the three proxy statements for every transaction into three 
classes listed – insiders, independent outsiders and gray directors. Gray directors are 
those who have material transactions with the firm in the period surrounding the merger. 
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4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 14 reports summary firm characteristics of the acquirer and target sample. 
The median asset size of the acquirers is $12.1 and of the targets $1.0 billion. The median 
market value of equity is $2.2 billion for the acquirers and $0.2 for the targets. Flannery, 
Kwan & Nimalendran (2001) report a mean market value of equity of $0.36 billion for a 
sample of 332 banks during the period 1990-1997. The targets in this sample are on 
average somewhat smaller than their sample and the acquirers significantly larger.  
The mean return on assets (ROA) of the acquirer (target) sample is 2.9% (2.6%). 
These figures are higher than the average of 1.07% (0.87%) reported by Houston, James 
& Ryngaert (2001) for acquirers (targets)34.  The average (median) market-to-book of 
assets of the acquirer sample is 1.127 (1.107) and of the target sample 1.083 (1.080). The 
average (median) market-to-book of equity of the acquirer sample is 2.586 (2.410) and of 
the target sample is 1.955 (1.860).  
The ratio of target ROA to acquirer ROA has an average (median) value of 92.2% 
(90.5%). The ratio is significantly below 1 at the 1% significance level. Similarly the 
mean ratio of the market-to-book of assets (equity) of the target firms to that of the 
acquirer firms is less than 1 at the 1% (1%) significance level. These results suggest that 
the acquirer firms are, on average, better performing than the targets.  
Table 15 reports summary statistics of the geographical separation of acquirers 
and targets and for a sub-sample of acquirers and targets, details of the loan portfolio. 
Geographical data is obtained from the proxy statement. Table 15, Panel A shows that in 
66 transactions both target and acquirer are from the same state. For the same state 
                                                 
34 Flannery et al do not report the ROA in their sample. 
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transactions the probability of at least one target director being hired is 0.73, significantly 
higher than 0.49 the probability when both are from different states (p-value = 1%). 
Loan data is obtained from the Chicago Federal Reserve (Chicago Fed) collection 
of quarterly call reports submitted by banks and bank holding companies to the Federal 
Reserve Board and is available for only a sub-sample of firms. Some of the firms that are 
identified as banks by CRSP are not listed in the Chicago Fed database. In some cases 
although the company is listed in the Chicago Fed database the data items are not 
available in the call reports or the call reports themselves are unavailable. All data items 
are available for 109 acquirers and 54 targets and for 46 acquirer-target pairs.  
Table 15 Panel B reports the ratio of loans to total assets. Panel B shows that the 
ratio of loans to total assets is approximately the same for the acquirer and target sub-
sample, with a mean around 60%. A pair-wise comparison shows that the mean (and 
median) ratios are insignificantly different. However a look at the composition of loan 
portfolios shows significant differences. Panel C reports the composition of the loan 
portfolio of acquirers and targets. Three components are reported - the loans that are 
made to individuals as a fraction of total loans, the fraction of real estate loans and the 
fraction of industrial and commercial loans made. The classes of loans used here conform 
to the classification used by banks in their reports to the Federal Reserve Board. 
Panel C shows that acquirers make a larger fraction of loans to individuals (mean 
17.30%) than targets (mean 11.17%). The proportion of industrial loans is higher in the 
acquirer sub-sample (mean 22.71%) than for targets (mean 17.55%). Also, targets have 
more real estate loans (mean 68.49%) than acquirers (mean 56.31%). A pair-wise 
comparison shows that the mean and median ratios are significantly different at the 1% 
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level. The two other classes of loans used in the call reports i.e. lease financing 
receivables and agricultural loans are a negligible fraction of the loan portfolio for both 
acquirers and targets and are therefore omitted from the analysis. 
In order to capture the differences between the loan composition of the acquirer 
and the target I compute the following distance measure. 
 
Comp_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans to individuals acq. – fraction of loans to individuals target)  
                                 + Abs(Fraction of real estate loans acq. – fraction of real estate loans target)  
                          + Abs(Fraction of industrial loans acq. – fraction of industrial loans target) 
 
I also compute the following distance measure to capture differences in the asset profile 
of the acquirer and target. 
Loan_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans in total assets acq. – Fraction of loans in total assets target) 
 
Summary statistics are in Table 15 Panel D. 
 Table 16 reports summary statistics of the boards of the pre-merger acquirer and 
the target samples. The acquirer boards with a mean (median) size of 14.62 (13.50) and 
mean (median) fraction of outsiders of 61.04% (60.00%) are in line with statistics 
reported by Houston, James & Ryngaert (2001) – for a sample of larger banks they report 
an average board size of 16 and % independent outsiders of 58% (the classification of 
outside directors in this study is closer to their definition of independent outside directors 
than all outside directors). 
Consistent with their larger size, acquirers have larger boards, lower CEO 
ownership and lower total ownership of board members compared to target firms. The 
median board size of 10 for targets is significantly smaller than that of acquirers at the 
1% level. CEO ownership and ownership of all board members of targets are each more 
than twice that of the corresponding figure for acquirers (differences significant at the 1% 
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level). The average of the median board age is approximately 60 for both target and 
acquirer. Median tenure of target directors at 10.61 years is larger than 8.44 years for 
acquirer directors (difference significant at the 1% level).  
Consistent with the larger board size of the acquirers the fraction of insiders is 
smaller than that of targets (difference significant at the 1% level). The leadership 
structure of the boards of the target and acquirer are significantly different. For the 
acquirers the CEO and chairman positions are separated in 33 (23%) cases. For targets 
this figure at 69 (49%) is significantly higher (P-value 1%). 
4.2 Changes in the acquirer board 
 Table 17 compares the acquirer board before and after the merger. The number of 
directors increases from an average (median) of 14.62 (13.50) to 16.21 (16.0). The 
difference and the % difference in board size are significant at the 1% level.  86 (61.0%) 
of the acquirers have an increase in board size post-merger, 30 (21.3%) have no change 
and 25 (17.7%) have a decrease. The proportion with an increase (decrease) in board size 
is greater (lesser) than 0.5 at the 1% level. Changes in board composition are smaller – 
insiders form an average (median) 16.9% (16.2%) of the board before the merger and 
15.9% (15.4%) after. The change in % insiders is significant at the 5% level. However, 
the % of outsiders remains roughly the same at 60% and the change in % outsiders across 
the merger is insignificant. 
In 85 (60%) out of the 141 transactions there is at least one target director on the 
survivor firm board. This proportion is greater than half at the 2% level. The average 
number of directors on the survivor board from the target board is 1.8. This is actually 
greater than the average increase in the board size of 1.64 and is not surprising given the 
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fact that some acquirers actually reduce their board size post-merger. The target CEO is 
chosen to be on the survivor board in 56 (40%) out of the 141 transactions35. The 
conditional probability of the CEO being chosen to the survivor board of 0.66 (56/85), is 
significantly greater than half at the 1% level. The unconditional probability that the 
target CEO is hired is less than half at the 2% level.  
4.3 Size of the survivor board and, probability of representation and extent of 
representation of target board on survivor board  
 We hypothesize that the survivor board is formed by changing the acquirer board 
to an extent determined by the scale and complexity of the merger. Therefore in the 
regression model for the board size of the survivor we include the pre-merger acquirer 
board size as a control variable and add proxies for the scale and complexity of the 
merger. Table 18 reports regression results for the size of the survivor board. After 
controlling for the size of the acquirer board pre-merger, the size of the survivor board is 
positively related to the size of the target board, and the relative size, market-to-book 
ratio and return on equity of the target.  
The significance of firm characteristics, after controlling for the board sizes of 
both acquirer and target, in predicting survivor board size, implies that the survivor board 
is not a simple union of the two boards. The coefficient of 0.043 on relative firm size (P-
value = 0.00) and 0.079 on the market-to-book (P-value = 0.07) ratio imply that a larger 
survivor board is required for mergers with relatively larger and higher growth targets. 
The positive coefficient of return on equity of the target (P-value = 0.00) is consistent 
with the argument that better performance of the target firm leads to more directors being 
                                                 
35 It is a coincidence that 85 the number with at least one director and 56 the number with the CEO adds up 
to 141 the sample size. 
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hired from the target board which in turn leads to a bigger survivor board. The positive 
coefficient of the mean age of acquirer directors (P-value = 0.06) may be due to the 
creation of additional capacity to account for retirements. A similar result for the target 
directors suggests that in a merger scenario more experienced target directors are valued 
more. 
The coefficient of 0.086 on target board size (P-value = 0.00) suggests that a 
bigger pool of potential directors increases the probability that an addition is made. 
However the positive coefficient may also be driven by some large and well-performing 
target boards contributing a large number of directors to the survivor board. This is 
further examined below. 
Table 19 reports results of logit regressions for the probability of at least one 
target director being chosen to the survivor board. As mentioned earlier in 85 out of 141 
(60.3%) transactions at least one target director is hired to the acquirer board. The 
probability is positively related to the relative size of the target (t = 4.96), the relative 
performance of the target (t = 2.58) and insignificantly related to the relative market-to-
book ratio of the target. However the probability is significantly negatively related to the 
stock return correlation. This suggests that directors of targets whose stocks are similar 
i.e. have greater co-movement with the acquirers’ stocks are less valuable and therefore 
less likely to be hired to the survivor board.  
The second and third columns of Table 19 show results for the sub-sample for 
which the loan distance and composition distance measures are available. The loan 
distance measure is negatively related to the probability of representation. This runs 
contrary to the result for stock correlation since greater distance means that the 
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companies are more dissimilar (stock return correlation remains negative and significant 
for the sub-sample).  The result suggests that greater differences in asset profiles makes 
the directors of the target less likely to be hired and less valuable. Similarly, composition 
distance has a negative coefficient but it is insignificant. For these two specifications the 
relative market-to-book ratio of the target is positively related to the probability of 
survival. A similar result obtains when the only the stock return correlation is used for 
this sub-sample. 
The probability of representation is associated positively with the acquirer board 
size. This is consistent with the argument that the marginal cost of adding a board 
member is lower for bigger boards. This is also consistent with the argument that certain 
boards follow a style of adding board members following mergers. Such board could 
grow large over time and their continued practice may result in the positive relation 
between existing board size and the probability of hiring a new director from the target 
firm. 
The probability of representation is insignificantly related to the target board size. 
This result holds both in a univariate regression and in specifications with alternative sets 
of control variables. The result is consistent with the argument that a bigger board does 
not necessarily mean a larger pool of potential directors. Instead, whether or not a pool of 
directors constitutes potential candidates for the survivor board is more importantly 
conditioned on the competence of the board. This result is all the more striking given 
prior results for banks, that bigger boards are associated with better performance (Adams 
& Mehran, 2002 and Belkhir 2004)36. On the other hand, if the Yermack (1996) results 
                                                 
36 When we replicate the regressions of Adams & Mehran (2002) and Belkhir (2004) we find no significant 
correlation between the market-to-book ratio and board size for both the target and acquirer sample. 
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were assumed to hold for banks, i.e. firms with smaller boards performed better then the 
poorer performance of a larger board would offset the higher probability of hiring due to 
a larger pool of directors and thus would lead to the insignificance of target board size in 
the regression. The ownership of the target CEO and, the ownership of the directors and 
their age (both acquirer and target) are not significant in any of the specifications. Finally, 
although the same state dummy is significant in univariate tests, in a multivariate setting 
it loses its significance. This could be partly due to the reason that same state mergers are 
significantly larger (median relative market value of equity =15.55%) compared to across 
state mergers (median relative market value of equity =8.69%) 
 Table 20 presents regression results (Panel A) for the number of target directors 
hired to the survivor board. Because this variable is discrete we also use a Poisson 
regression (Panel B). For the (OLS) Poisson model the dependent variable is (log) one 
plus the number of target directors hired. For the specifications that use the full sample 
the number of target directors hired is positively related to the board size of both acquirer 
(t =3.49 OLS, t =2.22 Poisson) and target (t =2.21 OLS and t =2.61 Poisson), relative size 
(t = 9.72 OLS, t =7.85 Poisson) and relative accounting performance measured by return 
on equity (t = 3.45 OLS, t = 3.01 Poisson) of the target. Similarly, the relative market-to-
book ratio of the target is positive and marginally significant in both models (t =1.73 
OLS, t =1.88 Poisson). These results are consistent with the scope, complexity and 
competence arguments made in the section on hypotheses development.  
 The ownership of the board members of the acquirer is positively associated with 
the number of target directors hired in the OLS specification (t = 1.70 OLS, t = 2.26 
Poisson). This result is intuitive from different viewpoints. On the one hand greater 
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ownership by the incumbent board members represents better incentive alignment. This 
could prompt the rational response of a more ‘co-operative’ board. On the other hand it is 
possible that greater ownership by the incumbent board members shields them (and the 
firm) from a potential conflict due to the presence of a significant number of target 
directors.  
 The coefficient on the ownership of the target board members is consistently 
negative and significant (t =-2.10 OLS, t =-2.22 Poisson). One possible interpretation of 
this result is that targets with greater ownership have entrenched management (Morck, 
Shleifer & Vishny) and mergers involving such targets have more of a disciplining 
stance. The probability of target directors being hired when the merger is for disciplining 
reasons is low. An alternative explanation is that when targets with highly concentrated 
ownership, typically small and family-owned signal a willingness to merge, the owners 
could be simultaneously exiting the business. Banking deregulation and the attendant 
shakeout during this period could play a significant role in motivating such a desire.  
Finally we find that the state dummy, the ownership of the target CEO and the age of the 
target and incumbent directors have no explanatory power. For the smaller sub-samples 
for which the loan and composition distance measures are available the results are mixed. 
Relative size, relative ROE and the ownership of the target directors are the variables that 
are consistently significant. The distance measures are insignificant. 
 The adjusted r-square (percentage of deviation explained) of the model that uses 
the full sample is 65.21% (73.85%). For the smaller sub-samples the r-squared of the 
OLS specifications are actually higher at 78.26% and 78.67% but significantly lower for 
the Poisson models. 
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4.4 Robustness 
4.4.1 Multiple acquisitions – The results so far assume that transactions are independent 
even when there are multiple acquisitions by the same acquirer. To account for the 
potential effects of clustering the following algorithm is used. Any acquisitions by the 
same acquirer that occur within 2 years of each other (i.e. with effective dates separated 
by less than two years) are classified as consecutive acquisitions. If there is a series of 
such acquisitions during the sample period then the whole series is classified as 
consecutive acquisitions. Target, acquirer and survivor, firm and governance 
characteristics in consecutive acquisitions are calculated as follows. 
1. Targets – All the targets in a set of consecutive acquisitions are pooled to form a 
single target. Weighted averages of all firm and board characteristics are 
calculated using targets’ market value of equity as weights. 
2. Acquirer – Acquirer firm and governance characteristics are recorded at the time 
of the first acquisition. 
3. Survivor – Survivor firm and governance characteristics are recorded at the time 
of the last acquisition. The number of target directors hired is the sum of the 
number of targets directors hired from all targets in the series. 
This method of handling multiple acquisitions is superior to using a dummy for 
subsequent acquisitions because a dummy variable would not capture the size and 
importance of the subsequent acquisitions. To the extent that these acquisitions are 
planned they may have a significant impact on the choice of directors from the current 
target. Considering only the last acquisition would be incorrect for similar reasons. In the 
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method described above all acquisitions are taken into consideration and are duly 
weighted. 
 Using the method of pooling described, the frequency of acquisitions is shown in 
Table 21, Panel A. Because of the pooling there are a total of 87 transactions. Using this 
sample of 87 transactions we replicate the following regressions, board size of the 
survivor, and probability and extent of representation. Results are in Table 21, Panel B.  
Column 1 shows that results for the survivor board size are similar to the 
regression results where each acquisition is treated as an independent observation. The 
following coefficients are different - the age variables lose their significance and the 
acquirer board ownership is significant and positive where earlier it was insignificant and 
positive. The r-squared at 72% is higher than that for the un-pooled sample (68%). The 
results in Column 2 for probability of representation are similar to the whole sample 
results. The target board size continues to be insignificant. The significance of the other 
variables remains largely unchanged. Column 3 reports results for the number of target 
directors hired. The significance of the main explanatory variables remains similar to the 
whole sample results. The result that the target ownership is negatively related to the 
number of directors hired still holds. Mean age of target directors is significant in the 
OLS. Overall, from Table 21 it is clear that the results are not driven due to clustering of 
acquisitions with some targets.  
4.4.2 Specification – This robustness test is related to the use of relative firm 
characteristics in the regression model. The arguments in the hypotheses section are made 
on the basis of relative firm characteristics since the acquirer board is already in existence 
and the target directors are incrementally added. However, it is possible to have a less 
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restrictive model in which acquirer and target characteristics are not constrained to have 
the same magnitude of coefficients. The regression results when acquirer and target 
characteristics enter the model independently are similar to the results obtained using 
relative firm characteristics with the target and acquirer characteristics usually having 
opposite signs. 
4.4.3 Filter based on relative size – For relatively small targets the ex-ante probability of 
a target director being hired is low. Therefore some of the variation that is induced in the 
probability and extent of representation may be “artificial”. Therefore I apply a relative 
size dummy – a variable that takes on a value of 1 for transactions where the market 
value of equity of the target is less than 5% of the market value of equity of the acquirer. 
The results are similar and the relative size dummy is insignificant. 
4.4.4 Consideration – It is possible that variation in the method of payment i.e. cash 
versus stock could affect the hiring of target directors. For example if the target directors 
own significant amounts of stock then a stock swap may increase the probability of hiring 
target directors since they may be large shareholders of the acquirer.  
Table 22 shows the mode of payment for the acquisitions. The sample consists of 
mainly pure stock deals (90%). There are 6 transactions where the target shareholders 
have a choice of either cash or stock and 5 where it is a fixed combination of cash and 
stock. The 4 cash deals are for Cornerstone Financial (acquired by BayBanks Inc.), 
Corpus Christi Bancshares (acquired by Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc.), CSF Holdings Inc 
(acquired by NationsBank) and Transworld Bancorp (acquired by Golden State Bancorp). 
The relative market value of the target in these acquisitions is quite small (0.66%, 2.54%, 
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1.15% and 7.18% respectively). Inclusion of a dummy variable for consideration type 
does not change any of the results. 
5. Conclusions 
 We study boards of 141 acquiring firms and their targets in the banking industry. 
Boards of acquiring firms change significantly around the merger – board size increases 
by an average of 1.6 directors (14%), an average of 1.80 target directors are added to the 
survivor board, in 60% of the transactions there is at least one target director added to the 
survivor board and the CEO of the target is chosen in 40% of the transactions37. 
 After controlling for pre-merger board size we find that the board size of the 
acquirer post-merger is determined by the relative size, relative market-to-book ratio, the 
relative accounting performance and board size of the target firm and its similarity to the 
acquirer as measured by the correlation of stock returns. The probability of hiring at least 
one target director and the number of target directors hired are similarly affected by these 
factors. Interestingly, though, the probability of hiring a target director is unaffected by 
the target board size. This suggests that the competence of the target board rather than its 
size comes into play and that there exist disciplining stances even in the so-called 
‘friendly’ mergers that were typical of the banking industry during this time. 
 The ownership of the board members of the acquirer is positively related to the 
formation of more co-operative boards (i.e. boards with target directors). However, the 
ownership of the target board members is negatively associated with the number of target 
directors hired. This result could be driven by owners of small targets i.e. those with high 
ownership concentration exiting the business at the time of the merger. 
                                                 
37 The changes in board composition are marginal. 
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Overall the results are consistent with the argument that board formation around 
mergers reflects choices aimed at efficiently tackling the monitoring task that is the 
responsibility of the board. In providing support for this proposition our paper extends the 
recent literature on corporate boards that examines the variation in their size and 
composition. Although we document that board size increases after mergers, we do not 
compare the board size to that of similar sized firms that were not involved in a merger. 
This would be useful in informing researchers if the boards of acquirers are larger in 
comparison to stand-alone firms. If this is indeed the case then the poorer performance of 
acquiring firms and their larger board size may throw light on the well-documented but 
puzzling negative relation between board size and firm performance. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
This dissertation examines changes in two important governance mechanisms – 
ownership structure and board structure, around restructuring events. Ownership structure 
is one of the most important external governance mechanisms and has held researchers 
interest since Berle & Means (1933). Board structure is one of the most important 
internal governance mechanisms and there is a large literature which reflects this 
importance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Together, these monitoring mechanisms are 
the most important means to mitigate agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers. The first essay of this dissertation examines the evolution of ownership 
structure of corporate spinoffs and the second examines changes in the board structure of 
acquirer banks around mergers. 
 Although the literature on each of these governance mechanisms is extensive 
there is little direct examination of the evolution of these mechanisms. A major obstacle 
to such examination is that firm governance changes slowly over time, making study 
expensive. Therefore the traditional approach has been to use a cross-section or panel of 
firms that are large and usually considered to be in equilibrium to establish reduced form 
results relating firm governance to proxies of monitoring requirements. This dissertation 
departs from this approach by focusing on the evolution of these governance 
mechanisms. 
 The choice of restructuring events is driven by their appropriateness to the 
mechanism under study. I choose corporate spinoffs to study ownership structure. 
Spinoffs inherit the ownership structure of the parent from which they are spun-off. This 
creates a unique natural experiment since the ownership structure remains the same but 
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all the aspects of firms that serve as proxies for monitoring requirements change sharply. 
Spinoffs are usually smaller, riskier, have significantly different growth potential and are 
usually in different industries. Existing theories of the endogenous determination of 
ownership structure suggest that the ownership structure that the spinoff inherits at the 
time of its inception should adapt to its firm characteristics. Empirical tests reveal that it 
does. 
 Using a sample of 117 transactions in the period 1980 to 2000 I find that the 
ownership structure of spinoffs changes rapidly and significantly. Average block 
ownership of spinoffs increases from an inherited level of 20.34% to 27.35% by the third 
year of the spinoffs’ existence. Similar large changes are observed for managerial and 
CEO ownership. Spinoffs begin with a level of block ownership that is significantly 
below the block ownership of a set of mature matching firms and in a series of 
progressively smaller changes have a level of block ownership that is insignificantly 
different from that of the matching firms by the third year. This set of results marks the 
first contribution of this essay – there are significant changes in ownership structure when 
the situation warrants them. 
 The changes in the block ownership of spinoffs are significantly related to firm 
characteristics that are used in the literature to explain the level of block ownership. 
These characteristics include, firm size, firm risk, market-to-book ratio, measures of 
industry similarity and the long run survival of the firm. Similarly, differences in the 
block ownership of spinoffs and the matching firms are increasingly significantly related 
to corresponding differences in firm characteristics. The adjusted r-squares of these 
regressions are comparable to those of models of the level of block ownership. These 
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results are the second contribution of this study – the significant changes in ownership 
structure of spinoffs occur in response to the changes in monitoring requirements of these 
firms. 
 Finally I find that the changes in block ownership of spinoffs are positively 
associated with the changes in the market-to-book ratio and the long-run survival of the 
firm. Similarly, the difference in block ownerships of spinoff and matching firms are 
increasingly positively related to the differences in the market-to-book ratio. These 
results are important since they confirm that the increasing block ownership of spinoffs is 
consistent with value-enhancements and does not simply entrench management or 
otherwise prevent takeovers. 
 In the second essay my co-authors and I use mergers and acquisitions to study the 
board structure of acquirer banks. Mergers typically lead to an increase in the acquirer’s 
size and complexity. This changes the monitoring task of the board of directors of the 
acquirer. We focus on banks in order to abstract from industry differences in firm 
governance and specifically board structure. The extensive wave of bank mergers in the 
second half of 1990s facilitates limiting the study to one industry. Our proposition is that 
forming a more co-operative board is value enhancing, provided the target board is 
effective. Therefore, we examine the determinants of the board size of the merged firm, 
the probability that at least one target director is hired and the number of target directors 
hired. 
 Using a sample of 141 mergers we find that that there is a significant 14% 
increase in acquirer board size and insignificant changes in its composition. After 
controlling for the target board size and the pre-merger acquirer board size we find that 
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the board size of the merged firm is positively related to the relative size and performance 
of the target and the mean age of the target and acquirer directors. The probability that at 
least one target director is hired is similarly positively related to the relative size and 
accounting performance of the target and the ownership of the acquirer directors after 
controlling for the acquirer and target board size. Greater similarity of target and acquirer 
as measured by the correlation of stock returns of acquirer and target in the pre-merger 
period is negatively related to the probability that a target director is hired. Most notably 
the target board size has no explanatory power.   
 After controlling for target and acquirer board size the number of target directors 
hired is positively related to the relative firm size, accounting performance and market-
to-book ratio of the target and negatively related to the stock return correlation of 
acquirer and target. The ownership of the target directors is negatively related to the 
number of target directors hired and is consistent with a disciplining argument as well as 
exit of target directors of smaller, family owned banks. Although geographical separation 
matters in univariate tests, in multivariate settings it has no significance. Similarly, for a 
sub-sample of banks with loan composition information differences in the loan portfolio 
have no significance in determining either the probability or extent of representation of 
target directors. 
 The results regarding the rational variation in the choice of target directors 
combined with the fact that the average number of target directors hired is greater than 
the average increase in the acquirer board size suggests that although board size of 
acquirer banks increases around mergers it does so for good reasons. 
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 The combined results of the two essays establish the following empirical 
regularity – firm governance changes around events that cause changes in governance 
requirements. Failure in recognizing this feature of firms and their governance 
mechanisms could results in errors in measuring the impact of governance on firm 
performance and ultimately may result in misguided policy decisions. 
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Appendix A 
Conditions for a spin-off to be a tax-free transaction 
According to IRC Section 355, unlike dividends in kind, a pro-rata distribution of a spin-
off firm is tax-free, provided the following conditions are met: 
1. The distributing company (parent) must have control of the spin-off firm. This is 
in order to ensure that the holders of the spin-off shares will be substantially the 
same as the holders of the parent company. 
2. A minimum of 80% of the ownership of the spin-off firm is distributed. This is in 
order to ensure that an independent company is created. 
3. The parent and the spin-off should have been involved in the active conduct of 
business during the 5 years preceding the distribution date. 
4. There must be a valid business purpose for the spin-off.  
 
Conditions for a spin-off to not be registered as a sale 
According to SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 4 (CF) the spin-off need not register under the 
Securities Act 1933 provided: 
1. Parent shareholders do not provide consideration for the spun-off shares 
2. The spin-off is pro-rata 
3. The parent provides adequate information about the spin-off and the subsidiary to 
its shareholders and to the trading markets 
4. The parent has a valid business purpose for the spin-off and 
5. If the parent spins-off restricted securities it has held those securities for at least 
two years. 
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Exhibit A 
The Spin-off 
On April 12, 2001, the Adaptec board declared a dividend to Adaptec stockholders of 
record on April 30, 2001, of shares of Roxio common stock. The dividend will be paid 
after the close of business on May 11, 2001, in the amount of 0.1646 shares of Roxio 
common stock for each share outstanding of Adaptec common stock. 
Adaptec stockholders will not be required to pay any cash or other consideration for the 
shares of Roxio common stock distributed to them or to surrender or exchange their 
shares of Adaptec common stock to receive the dividend of Roxio common stock. 
The Number of Shares Received 
Adaptec stockholders who sell their shares of Adaptec common stock between the record 
date and the distribution date in the "regular way" market will also be selling their Roxio 
dividend shares, as explained below. 
Trading between the Record Date and the Distribution Date 
After the record date and through May 11, 2001, the distribution date, there may be two 
markets in Adaptec common stock, a "regular way" market and a "when issued" market. 
Shares that trade on the "regular way" market will be reported under Adaptec's ticker 
symbol "ADPT" and will trade with an entitlement to shares of Roxio common stock 
distributed pursuant to the spin-off. Shares that trade on the "when issued" market will be 
reported under the special ticker symbol "ADPTV" and will trade without an entitlement 
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to shares of Roxio common stock distributed pursuant to the spin-off. Therefore, those 
who own shares of Adaptec common stock on the record date, and sell those shares on 
the "regular way" market prior to or on May 11, 2001, the distribution date, will also be 
selling the shares of Roxio common stock that would have been distributed to them 
pursuant to the spin-off. If those shares of Adaptec common stock are sold on the "when 
issued" market prior to the distribution date, the stockholder will still receive the shares 
of Roxio common stock that were to be distributed to him/her pursuant to his/her 
ownership of the shares of Adaptec common stock. 
Furthermore, it is expected that between the record date and distribution date there will 
develop a "when-issued" trading market in Roxio shares. The "when-issued" trading 
market will be for shares of Roxio common stock that will be distributed to Adaptec 
stockholders on the distribution date. Those that own shares of Adaptec common stock at 
the close of business on the record date are entitled to shares of Roxio common stock 
distributed pursuant to the spin-off. Stockholders may trade this entitlement to shares of 
Roxio common stock, without the shares of Adaptec common stock owned, on the Roxio 
"when-issued" trading market. With the Roxio Form 10 Registration Statement now 
declared effective, such trading may begin at any time. 
When and How the Dividend will be Paid 
Adaptec will pay the dividend after the close of business on May 11, 2001 by releasing 
the shares of Roxio common stock to be distributed in the spin-off to Chase Mellon 
Shareholder Services, Adaptec's transfer agent. After the close of business on May 11, 
2001, the transfer agent will cause the shares of Roxio common stock to which an 
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Adaptec stockholder is entitled, to be registered in his/her name or in the "street name" of 
his/her brokerage firm. Most Adaptec stockholders have their Adaptec certificates held 
on account by a stock brokerage firm. In such cases, the brokerage firm is the registered 
holder or "street name" and the physical Roxio certificates will be mailed to the 
brokerage firm. These brokers will in turn electronically credit the appropriate accounts 
for the Roxio shares received. This will take three to eight business days after the 
distribution date. Persons with questions in this regard should contact their broker on the 
mechanics of having the Roxio shares posted to their account. 
Roxio certificates representing ownership of whole shares of Roxio common stock will 
be mailed directly from the transfer agent to persons who physically hold their Adaptec 
stock certificates and are the registered holders. The transfer agent will begin mailing 
such stock certificates promptly after the distribution date. 
The transfer agent will not deliver any fractional shares of Roxio common stock in 
connection with the spin-off. Instead, the transfer agent will aggregate all fractional 
shares and sell them on behalf of those holders who otherwise would be entitled to 
receive a fractional share. Such holders will then receive a cash payment in an amount 
equal to their pro rata share of the total net proceeds of that sale. Checks for any cash that 
individuals may be entitled to receive instead of fractional shares of Roxio common stock 
will follow separately. We currently estimate that it will take about two weeks from the 
dividend payment date for the transfer agent to complete these mailings. 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 1TABLE 0 – List of variables for Chapter 1 
Variable name Description 
Market equity Market value of the firm’s common stock (in descriptive statistics I use 2003 
constant dollars) 
Assets Book value of total assets (in descriptive statistics I use  2003 constant dollars) 
Sales Dollar value of the firms sales (in descriptive statistics I use 2003 constant 
dollars) 
Idiosyncratic risk Standard error of a market model using the CRSP value weighted index. For 
the spin-off and matching firm I use the 36 months beginning with the spin-
off’s existence. For the parent firm I use the 36 months preceding the first firm 
announcement of the spin-off 
Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the same period as above 
Beta Derived from the model above 
Leverage Ratio of book value of long term debt to book value of assets 
Capx. to assets Ratio of capital expenditures to assets 
PPE ratio Ratio of net property plant and equipment to total assets 
Q Market-to-book of assets calculated as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of assets less the book value of equity divided by the book value of 
assets 
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by book value of assets 
Relatedness Correlation of monthly stock returns of the spin-off and the parent in the first 
36 months after the spin-off  
Vertical relatedness Define aij as the dollar value of industry i’s output to produce industry j’s total 
output. Vij is defined as aij divided by the dollar output of industry j. The 
relatedness of spinoffs and parents is calculated as ½(Vij+ Vji) where i and j are 
the parent and spinoff industry respectively 
Complementarity For spinoff industry i calculate the fraction supplied to each other industry k 
(except the parent industry). This gives us a vector Vik . Similarly, calculate Bik 
as the fraction obtained as input from each industry (except the parent 
industry). Calculate corresponding vectors Vjk and Bjk where j is the parent 
industry. Complementarity is calculated as ½(corr(Vik Vjk)+corr(Bik Bjk )). 
Survivorship dummy Dummy that equals 1 if the firm’s delisting code in December 2003 is 100, 0 
otherwise 
Block ownership Fraction of voting rights held by all owners who own at least 5% of voting 
rights 
Inside blocks Sum of all blocks of at least 5% where the beneficial owner is held either a 
director or officer of the firm 
Management 
ownership 
% of voting rights held by all officers and directors of the firm 
CEO ownership % of voting rights held by the named CEO of the firm (if no CEO is named I 
pick the ownership of the Chairman-President and the larger of the two if the 
role is split) 
Management dummy Dummy that equals 1 if management ownership defined above is more than 
25% 
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Table 2TABLE 1 – Sample firms by year and industry 
PANEL A - Spin-off sample by year 
Year 
Number of Spin-
offs 
% of 
Sample 
1981 3 2.6% 
1982 2 1.7% 
1983 0 0.0% 
1984 1 0.9% 
1985 3 2.6% 
1986 2 1.7% 
1987 4 3.4% 
1988 4 3.4% 
1989 7 6.0% 
1990 4 3.4% 
1991 1 0.9% 
1992 6 5.1% 
1993 4 3.4% 
1994 6 5.1% 
1995 7 6.0% 
1996 17 14.5% 
1997 17 14.5% 
1998 13 11.1% 
1999 14 12.0% 
2000 2 1.7% 
   
Total 117  
 
 
PANEL B – Spin-off sample by industry type 
Industry Name 
Number of 
Spin-offs 
% of 
Sample 
   
Utilities 7 6.0% 
Financial 9 7.7% 
Service Industries 20 17.1% 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 16 13.7% 
Manufacturing 60 51.3% 
Construction & Mining 5 4.3% 
   
Total 117  
 
Table 3TABLE 2 – Firm characteristics of spin-offs, parent firms and matching firms 
Volatility of spin-off is measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the first 36 months of the firm’s existence. For the parent it is measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly returns in the 36 months preceding the first firm announcement of the spin-off. For the matching firm the period used is the same calendar period as for the 
corresponding spin-off. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard error from a market model using the CRSP value weighted index for the same periods. Beta is derived from the same 
model. Q is defined as the market-to-book ratio of assets. Return on assets is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by book value of assets. Dollar values are in 
2003 constant dollars. Correlations and paired t-tests for means and medians are reported. *, ** and **** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
PANEL A: Comparison of firm characteristics of spin-offs and parent 
   Spin-off Parent
    Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev.
T-stat for diff. 
in means  
T-stat for diff. in 
medians  Correlation 
Book Value of Assets ($ mio)         2199.93 588.45 11562.20 6311.89 3035.40 10645.30 -5.06 -8.78 0.718***
Market Value of Equity ($ mio) 1179.26         453.72 1882.01 5578.82 2647.64 10047.50 -4.99 -8.22 0.496***
Sales ($ mio) 1418.66 639.59 2156.19 5709.29      2920.97 8678.98 -6.00 -8.86 0.649***
Employees (thousands) 10.07 3.50 29.92       34.66 15.29 62.53 -5.86 -8.84 0.792***
Volatility      0.1353 0.1221 0.0541 0.0917 0.0835 0.0366 -10.29 -7.91 0.542***
Idiosyncratic risk 0.1263 0.1119 0.0539       0.0801 0.0684 0.0357 -11.07 -8.28 0.552***
Beta      1.0506 1.0352 0.6642 1.1017 1.0250 0.4848 -0.79 -0.73 0.301***
Leverage       0.2095 0.1916 0.1775 0.2053 0.1706 0.1443 0.11 0.16 0.555***
Q      1.7520 1.3092 1.1399 1.5951 1.4299 0.5295 1.36 -0.19 0.194**
ROA      0.1147 0.1317 0.1272 0.1415 0.1396 0.0630 -2.43 -0.88 0.260***
 
PANEL B: Comparison of firm characteristics of spin-offs and matching firms 
  Spin-off Match Firm  
    Mean Std.Dev.Median Mean Median Std.Dev.
T-stat for diff. 
in means  
T-stat for diff. 
in medians  Correlation 
Book Value of Assets ($ mio) 2199.93 588.45        11562.20 2378.11 502.82 8498.05 -0.29 0.28 0.931***
Market Value of Equity ($ mio) 1179.26         453.72 1882.01 1481.79 415.69 3342.51 -1.31 -0.44 0.657***
Sales ($ mio) 1418.66 639.59 2156.19       1108.77 522.68 1464.25 1.72 1.60 0.525***
Employees (thousands) 10.07 3.50 29.92       6.78 2.32 9.75 1.42 0.77 0.509***
Volatility          0.1353 0.1221 0.0541 0.1417 0.1207 0.0723 -0.95 0.19 0.365***
Idiosyncratic risk 0.1263 0.1119 0.0539       0.1277 0.1099 0.0664 -0.22 0.75 0.392***
Beta        1.0506 0.66421.0352 1.2435 1.1238 0.8527 -2.00 -1.87 0.064 
Leverage          0.2095 0.1916 0.1775 0.1790 0.1404 0.1735 1.45 1.47 0.180**
Q       1.7520 1.13991.3092 1.7653 0.94091.4497 -0.11 -1.90 0.249***
ROA         0.1147 0.12720.1317 0.1188 0.1235 0.1003 -0.32 0.23 0.253***
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 Table 4TABLE 3 – Changes in ownership structure of spin-offs and matching firms 
Block ownership is defined as the fraction of shares held by all holders who hold more than 5%. An inside block holder is either an officer or director of the firm. Management 
ownership is defined as the % shares held by officers and directors of the firm. It includes options that can vest within the next 60 days. This is also true of CEO ownership. 
Outstanding shares include options that can vest in the next 60 days. Each vote is counted as a share. Dual classes are combined into a single class based on voting rights. Non-
voting shares are not considered. Paired t-tests for means and medians are reported. For the parent/spin-off comparison these appear in the columns to the right. For the spin-
off/match firm comparison these appear in rows below each description of ownership. 
 
   PANEL A  T-stats for Tests of Differences In  Comparison to 
   Block Ownership Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
         Yr 0 Yr 1  Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr1-Yr0 Yr2-Yr0 Yr3-Yr0 Yr2-Yr1 Yr3-Yr1 Yr3-Yr2
Spin-off            Mean 0.2034 0.2422 0.2658 0.2735 2.85 3.85 4.06 2.31 2.36 0.87
 Median           0.1803 0.2187 0.2423 0.2604 3.33 3.99 4.20 2.51 2.44 0.69
    Std. 0.1670 0.1496 0.1525 0.1761       
Matching Firm Mean  0.2983 0.2997 0.2922       -0.16 0.59 0.78
 Median           0.2584 0.2747 0.2670 0.00 0.52 0.71
        Std. 0.1993 0.2086 0.2066    
T-stat for Diff. in Means           -2.72 -1.59 -0.82
T-stat for Diff. in Medians     -2.50 -1.43 0.79       
   PANEL B  T-stats for Tests of Differences In  Comparison to 
   Insider Blocks  Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
            Yr 0 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr1-Yr0 Yr2-Yr0 Yr3-Yr0 Yr2-Yr1 Yr3-Yr1 Yr3-Yr2
Spin-off            Mean 0.0751 0.0670 0.0664 0.0692 -0.94 -0.92 -0.58 -0.23 0.61 0.78
 Median           0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Std. 0.1316 0.1410 0.1394 0.1464       
Matching Firm Mean  0.1495 0.1475 0.1404     -0.42 -1.03 -0.92
 Median           0.0609 0.0581 0.0591 -0.61 -0.87 0.43
        Std. 0.2052 0.2060 0.1997    
T-stat for Diff. in Means           -4.11 -3.87 -3.4
T-stat for Diff. in Medians     -3.32 -2.99 -2.65       
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Block ownership is defined as the fraction of shares held by all holders who hold more than 5%. An inside block holder is either an officer or director of the firm. Management 
ownership is defined as the % shares held by officers and directors of the firm. It includes options that can vest within the next 60 days. This is also true of CEO ownership. 
Outstanding shares include options that can vest in the next 60 days. Each vote is counted as a share. Dual classes are combined into a single class based on voting rights. Non-
voting shares are not considered. Paired t-tests for means and medians are reported. For the parent/spin-off comparison these appear in the columns to the right. For the spin-
off/match firm comparison these appear in rows below each description of ownership. 
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   PANEL C  T-stats for Tests of Differences In  Comparison to 
   Management Ownership Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
         Yr 0 Yr 1  Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr1-Yr0 Yr2-Yr0 Yr3-Yr0 Yr2-Yr1 Yr3-Yr1 Yr3-Yr2
Spin-off       Mean 0.1046 0.0891 0.0887 0.0969 -2.19 -1.93 -0.90 -0.05 1.37 2.24
 Median           0.0432 0.0269 0.0392 0.0482 -2.82 -0.67 -1.03 4.54 4.22 4.45
    Std. 0.1369 0.1187 0.1089 0.1087       
Matching Firm Mean  0.1982 0.1938 0.1933      -1.05 -0.11 0.85
 Median           0.1099 0.1196 0.1273 -1.02 -1.05 0.53
        Std. 0.2030 0.2034 0.2023    
T-stat for Diff. in Means           5.81 5.6 -5.11
T-stat for Diff. in Medians     5.42 5.16 -5.12       
   PANEL D  T-stats for Tests of Differences In  Comparison to 
   CEO Ownership  Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
         Yr 0 Yr 1  Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr1-Yr0 Yr2-Yr0 Yr3-Yr0 Yr2-Yr1 Yr3-Yr1 Yr3-Yr2
Spin-off            Mean 0.0326 0.0215 0.0230 0.0274 -2.21 -1.95 -1.00 1.49 2.94 2.2
 Median           0.0057 0.0057 0.0087 0.0116 0.00 0.75 2.33 4.23 5.35 5.80
    Std. 0.0642 0.0449 0.0434 0.0476       
Matching Firm Mean  0.0994 0.0982 0.0955     -0.31 -0.71 -0.66
 Median           0.0252 0.0252 0.0276 0.00 0.95 1.05
        Std. 0.1621 0.1662 0.1623    
T-stat for Diff. in Means           -5.26 -4.9 -4.65
T-stat for Diff. in Medians     -6.59 -5.64 -5.36       
Table 5TABLE 3 – Changes in ownership structure of spin-offs and matching firms (contd.) 
 
 
 Table 6TABLE 4 – Serial correlation of ownership structure of spin-offs and matching firms 
The correlation between ownership measures of the parent prior to the spin-off and the spin-off firm/match firm in the 
first 3 years of the spin-off firm’s existence are reported. Block ownership is defined as the fraction of shares held by 
all holders who hold more than 5%. An inside block holder is one who is either an officer or director of the firm. 
Management ownership is defined as the % shares held by officers and directors of the firm. It includes options that can 
vest within the next 60 days. This is also true of CEO ownership. Outstanding shares include options that can vest in 
the next 60 days. Each vote is counted as a share. Dual classes are combined into a single class based on voting rights. 
Non-voting shares are not considered. 
 
  PANEL A   
Correlation of spin-off ownership structure and the parent ownership structure prior to spin-off 
     
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  
Block Ownership 0.5706*** 0.3992*** 0.3789***  
Insider Blocks 0.7701*** 0.7320*** 0.7034***  
Management Ownership 0.8281*** 0.7610*** 0.7391***  
CEO Ownership 0.5365*** 0.5571*** 0.5019***  
 
  PANEL B   
Correlation of the ownership structure of the matched firm and its own prior ownership structure 
     
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  
Block Ownership 0.8924*** 0.8568*** 0.7938***  
Insider Blocks 0.9766*** 0.9463*** 0.929***  
Management Ownership 0.9755*** 0.9531*** 0.9227***  
CEO Ownership 0.9842*** 0.9865*** 0.9601***  
 
  PANEL C   
Correlation of the ownership structure of the matched firm and the spin-off firm 
     
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  
Block Ownership 0.2086** 0.2156** 0.1744*  
Insider Blocks 0.2551*** 0.1861** 0.1716*  
Management Ownership 0.2931*** 0.2726*** 0.2533***  
CEO Ownership 0.1651* 0.1248 0.2204**  
 
  PANEL D   
Correlation of the ownership structure of the matched firm and the parent ownership structure prior to spin-off 
     
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  
Block Ownership 0.3064*** 0.2473*** 0.2493***  
Insider Blocks 0.3246*** 0.2804*** 0.2788***  
Management Ownership 0.3233*** 0.3200*** 0.2853***  
CEO Ownership 0.0927 0.0619 0.0842  
*,** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
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Table 7TABLE 5 – Correlation of block ownership by industry relatedness 
The correlations between ownership measures of the parent prior to the spin-off and the spinoff, in the first 3 years of 
the spinoffs’ existence are reported for groups formed on the basis of industry relatedness. Block ownership is defined 
as the fraction of shares held by all holders who hold more than 5%. Management ownership is defined as the % shares 
held by officers and directors of the firm. It includes options that can vest within the next 60 days. Outstanding shares 
include options that can vest in the next 60 days. Each vote is counted as a share. Dual classes are combined into a 
single class based on voting rights. Non-voting shares are not considered.  
 
Vertical relatedness is calculated (Fan & Lang 2000) as follows. Define aij as the dollar value of industry i’s output to 
produce industry j’s total output. Vij is defined as aij divided by the dollar output of industry j. The relatedness of 
spinoffs and parents is calculated as ½(Vij+ Vji) where I and j are the parent and spinoff industry respectively (Fan and 
Lang 2000 provides the concordance between SIC codes and the input-output tables). Complementarity is calculated 
(Fan & Lang 2000) as follows. For spinoff industry I calculate the fraction supplied to each other industry k (except the 
parent industry). This gives us a vector Vik . In a similar manner calculate Bik as the fraction obtained as input from 
each industry (except the parent industry). Calculate corresponding vectors Vjk and Bjk where j is the parent industry. 
Complementarity is calculated as ½(corr(Vik Vjk)+corr(Bik Bik )). High and low vertical relatedness groups 
(complementarity) are formed based on median splits. All reported correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Correlation of spin-off ownership structure and the parent ownership structure prior to spin-off 
Block Ownership Management Ownership 
PANEL 
A 
Different 2 digit SIC 
code 
Same 2 digit SIC 
code 
Different 2 digit 
SIC code 
Same 2 digit SIC 
code 
Year 1 0.5791 0.5492 0.8197 0.8577 
Year 2 0.3824 0.4457 0.7301 0.8682 
Year 3 0.3692 0.5205 0.7418 0.7806 
PANEL 
B 
Low vertical 
relatedness 
High vertical 
relatedness 
Low vertical 
relatedness 
High vertical 
relatedness 
Year 1 0.4917 0.6785 0.7726 0.9024 
Year 2 0.2770 0.5413 0.6917 0.8532 
Year 3 0.3152 0.7710 0.5188 0.7892 
PANEL 
C 
Low 
complementarity 
High 
complementarity 
Low 
complementarity 
High 
complementarity 
Year 1 0.5392 0.6367 0.9105 0.7416 
Year 2 0.3789 0.4401 0.7687 0.7598 
Year 3 0.3131 0.4801 0.8023 0.6784 
All correlations are significant at the 1% level
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Table 8TABLE 6 – Determinants of changes in block ownership of spin-offs 
Descriptive statistics of measures of beginning ownership and 3 year changes in these measures are presented for 
different terciles. Relative size terciles are based on the relative market value of equity of the spin-off in year 1 to the 
parent in year 0.  Relative idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that uses 
the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. For the parent firm the 36 months preceding the first firm 
announcement of the spin-off are used. Q is measured as the market-to-book of assets in year 1 for the spin-off and 
measured prior to the spin-off for the parent. Stock return correlation terciles use the correlation between the monthly 
stock return of the parent and spin-off in the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. Survivorship is a dummy 
which takes on a value of 1 if the spin-off is still surviving, 0 otherwise. Prior block ownership terciles use the block 
ownership of the parent prior to the spin-off. 
 
Panel A - Relative size  Panel B - Relative idiosyncratic risk  
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Tercile 1 (lowest) 0.143 0.112 0.135 0.111 0.209 0.180 0.044 0.077 
         
Tercile 2 0.224 0.182 0.063 0.084 0.209 0.180 0.075 0.075 
         
Tercile 3 (highest) 0.249 0.224 0.011 0.006 0.192 0.169 0.091 0.110 
 
Panel C – Relative Q Panel D – Stock return correlation 
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Tercile 1 (lowest) 0.186 0.152 0.130 0.863 0.160 0.118 0.122 0.112 
         
Tercile 2 0.198 0.155 0.058 0.051 0.236 0.198 0.030 0.036 
         
Tercile 3 (highest) 0.226 0.200 -0.017 -0.005 0.211 0.191 0.062 0.078 
     
Panel E - Prior block ownership  
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Tercile 1 (lowest) 0.033 0.000 0.164 0.147 
     
Tercile 2 0.180 0.180 0.087 0.083 
     
Tercile 3 (highest) 0.397 0.365 -0.041 0.005 
 
Panel F - 1 digit SIC code 
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Same code 0.202 0.180 0.056 0.068 
     
Different code 0.205 0.180 0.085 0.084 
 
Panel G – Survivorship 
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Survivors 0.212 0.182 0.087 0.083 
     
Non-survivors 0.196 0.171 0.028 0.035 
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Table 9TABLE 6 – Determinants of changes in block ownership of spin-offs 
Descriptive statistics of measures of beginning ownership and 3 year changes in these measures are presented for 
terciles formed on the basis of vertical relatedness and complementarity. Block ownership is defined as the fraction of 
shares held by all holders who hold more than 5%. Each vote is counted as a share. Dual classes are combined into a 
single class based on voting rights. Non-voting shares are not considered.  
 
Vertical relatedness is calculated (Fan & Lang 2000) as follows. Define aij as the dollar value of industry i’s output to 
produce industry j’s total output. Vij is defined as aij divided by the dollar output of industry j. The relatedness of 
spinoffs and parents is calculated as ½(Vij+ Vji) where i and j are the parent and spinoff industry respectively (Fan and 
Lang 2000 provides the concordance between SIC codes and the input-output tables). Complementarity is calculated 
(Fan & Lang 2000) as follows. For spinoff industry i calculate the fraction supplied to each other industry k (except the 
parent industry). This gives us a vector Vik . In a similar manner calculate Bik as the fraction obtained as input from 
each industry (except the parent industry). Calculate corresponding vectors Vjk and Bjk where j is the parent industry. 
Complementarity is calculated as ½(corr(Vik Vjk)+corr(Bik Bik )). High and low vertical relatedness groups 
(complementarity) are formed based on median splits. All reported correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Panel H – Vertical relatedness 
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Tercile 1 (lowest) 0.206 0.184 0.098 0.112 
     
Tercile 2 0.198 0.180 0.059 0.072 
     
Tercile 3 (highest) 0.206 0.180 0.054 0.060 
Panel I – Complementarity 
 Yr 0 Yr3-Yr0 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Tercile 1 (lowest) 0.216 0.188 0.119 0.103 
     
Tercile 2 0.200 0.183 0.047 0.061 
     
Tercile 3 (highest) 0.194 0.179 0.061 0.078 
 
 
 
Table 10TABLE 6 - Determinants of changes in block ownership of spin-offs (contd.) 
The dependent variable is the log of block ownership of the spin-off firm in year 3 minus the log of block ownership of the parent firm prior to the spin-off. Relative market equity 
is the log of the ratio of the market equity of the spin-off to the parent prior to the spin-off. Relative Q is measured similarly using the market-to-book of assets and is logged. 
Relative idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. For the parent firm the 36 
months preceding the first firm announcement of the spin-off are used. The log of the ratio is used here. Stock return correlation is the log of the stock return correlation calculated 
as  the correlation between the monthly stock return of the parent and spin-off in the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence Survivorship is a dummy which takes on a 
value of 1 if the spin-off is still surviving , 0 otherwise. Ownership rank is the tercile rank of the spin-off firm ranked upon the basis of block ownership of the parent prior to the 
spin-off. Vertical relatedness and industry complementarity are defined on the previous page. Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are provided in parentheses. 
Panel J 
 Change in log of block ownership of the spin-off firm from yr0 to yr3 
Intercept      -0.0182 0.0438 0.0559      0.1415 0.0858 0.0894 0.0578 0.0423 0.0379 0.0982 0.1194
 (-1.01)           (2.27) (4.29) (7.78) (4.64) (4.11) (3.80) (2.29) (1.85) (2.71) (3.43)
Relative market equity   -0.0325         -0.0205 -0.0154
 (-3 8)          .2 (-1.68) (-1.88)
Relative idiosyncratic risk             0.0317 -0.0261 -0.2310
           (1.03) -0.75 (-0.89)
Relative Q            -0.0483 -0.0406 -0.1018
           (-2.23) (-1.69) (-2.15)
Ownership rank            -0.0841 -0.0856 -0.0489
           (-5.95) (-5.18) (-3.96)
SIC dummy           -0.0469  
            (-1.82)
Stock return correlation           -0.1156 -0.0277 
     1 2)      (- .7 (-0.43) 
Vertical Relatedness         -0.0717    -0.1514
       2.24)   (-   (-1.93)
Industry Comeplementarity           -0.0223  0.0484
           (-2.29)  (0.78)
Survivorship dummy            0.0340 0.0482 0.0485
            (1.24) (1.86) (1.88)
            
Adjusted R-squared 8.44% 0.05% 3.37% 23.12% 2.02% 1.69%   1.49% 1.76% 0.47% 27.55% 26.27%
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 Table 11TABLE 7 – Determinants of ownership structure of spin-offs, parent firms and matching firms 
The dependent variable is the log of block ownership for the parent prior to the spin-off and in year 1 for the spin-off/match-firm. Market equity is the log of the market value of 
equity. Idiosyncratic risk is the log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s 
existence. The same calendar months are used for the match firm. For the parent firm the 36 months preceding the first firm announcement of the spin-off are used. Q is measured 
as the market-to-book of assets. The log value is used here. Capex. to assets is the log of the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. PPE ratio is the log of the ratio of net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets. Leverage is the log of the book value of debt to book value of assets. Management dummy takes on a value of 1 if the officers and directors of 
the firms own more than 25% of the voting rights of the firm, 0 otherwise. Survivorship is a dummy which takes on a value of 1 if the spin-off is still surviving, 0 otherwise. 
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are provided below each coefficient estimate. 
PANEL A 
   Parent Spin-off Match firm  Spin-off using inherited ownership 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept             0.6831 0.5613 0.5661 0.3839 0.3000 0.2843 0.4503 0.3959 0.3728 0.4140 0.3287 0.3190
 (8.91)            (8.33) (8.36) (4.82) (4.19) (3.98) (5.00) (4.54) (4.20) (4.22) (4.01) (3.86)
Log of market equity -0.0264 -0.0161 -0.0126 -0.0183 -0.1078        -0.0117 -0.0415 -0.0334 -0.0361 -0.0116 0.0003 -0.0020
 (-3.06)            (-1.92) (-1.63) (-2.30) (-1.87) (-1.55) (-4.10) (-3.37) (-3.58) (-1.18) (0.04) (-0.23)
Log of idiosyncratic risk             0.1109 0.1104 0.1126 0.0589 0.0492 0.0379 -0.0226 -0.0262 -0.0288 0.0912 0.0877 0.0807
 (3.40)            (4.02) (4.08) (2.10) (1.97) (1.48) (-0.71) (-0.87) (-0.96) (2.64) (3.07) (2.73)
Log Q (market-to-book)             -0.0225 -0.0429 -0.0444 -0.0203 -0.0259 -0.0246 0.0731 0.0751 0.0753 0.0273 0.0235 0.0243
 (-0.55)            (-1.24) (-1.27) (-0.93) (-1.33) (-1.28) (2.16) (2.33) (2.35) (1.01) (1.05) (1.09)
Log of capex. to assets             -0.2854 -0.2458 -0.2301 -0.0401 -0.2342 -0.2301 -0.4368 -0.4558 -0.4417 -0.0509 -0.3217 -0.3191
 (-0.91)            (-0.93) (-0.87) (-0.13) (-0.82) (-0.81) (-1.14) (-1.25) (-1.21) (-0.13) (-0.98) (-0.98)
Log of PPE ratio -0.0374 -0.0002           -0.0109 -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0142 -0.0218 -0.0270 -0.0257 0.0033 0.0039 0.0058
 (-0.34)            (0.00) (-0.12) (-1.17) (-1.36) (-1.11) (-1.59) (-1.93) (-1.84) (0.19) (0.27) (0.39)
Log of leverage             -0.0314 -0.0233 -0.0196 0.2343 0.2235 0.2141 0.2434 0.1566 0.1718 0.1104 0.1068 0.1010
 (-0.27)            (-0.24) (-0.20) (3.08) (3.29) (3.17) (2.18) (1.44) (1.77) (0.17) (1.07) (1.19)
Management dummy  0.1674        0.1667 0.1563 0.1584 0.1161 0.1195 0.2142 0.2155
         (6.45) (6.41) (5.88) (6.01) (3.43) (3.53) (7.04) (7.07)
Survivorship dummy          0.0166  0.0356  0.0367  0.0206
             (0.86) (1.72) (1.25) (0.91)
             
Adjusted R-squared             29.12% 49.60% 49.46% 18.09% 35.95% 37.15% 12.19% 21.22% 21.66% 6.66% 36.34% 36.25%
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Table 12TABLE 7 - Determinants of block ownership of spin-offs, parent firms and matching firms (contd.) 
The dependent variable is the log of block ownership in year 1, 2 and 3 for the spin-off/match-firm. Market equity is the log of the market value of equity. Idiosyncratic risk is the 
log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. The same calendar months 
are used for the match firm. Q is measured as the market-to-book of assets. The log value is used here. Capex. to assets is the log of the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. PPE 
ratio is the log of the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. Leverage is the log of the book value of debt to book value of assets. Management dummy takes on a 
value of 1 if the officers and directors of the firms own more than 25% of the voting rights of the firm, 0 otherwise. Survivorship is a dummy which takes on a value of 1 if the 
spin-off is still surviving, 0 otherwise. Lagged-ownership is the ownership of the parent prior to the spin-off for the spin-offs. It is the ownership in year 1 for the matched firm. 
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are provided in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
PANEL B 
Spin-off Match firm Spin-off Match firm
          Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr 1 Yr2 Yr3
Intercept            0.2843 0.2301 0.2656 0.3728 0.3956 0.3536 0.2199 0.2293 0.3460 0.0344 0.0449
 (3.98)           (3.33) (2.84) (4.20) (4.33) (3.66) (3.85) (4.190 (4.420 (0.50) (0.78)
Log of market equity -0.0117 -0.0229 -0.0229 -0.0361        -0.0241 -0.0271 -0.0123 -0.0208 -0.0184 -0.0008 -0.0059
 (-1.55)           (-2.94) (-2.40) (-3.58) (-2.35) (-2.92) (-1.84) (-2.88) (-2.08) (-0.16) (-1.15)
Log of idiosyncratic risk            0.0379 -0.0352 -0.0216 -0.0288 -0.0175 -0.0241 0.0051 -0.0484 0.0228 -0.0066 -0.0174
 (1.48)           (-1.32) (-0.58) (-0.96) (-0.54) (-0.74) (0.21) (-1.88) (0.53) (-0.37) (-0.33)
Log Q (market-to-book) -0.0246 -0.0322 -0.0016 0.0753        0.0500 0.0430 -0.0322 -0.0381 0.0083 0.0015 -0.0135
 (-1.28)           (-1.52) (-0.07) (2.35) (1.42) (1.20) (-1.88) (-1.95) (0.350 (0.09) (-0.68)
Log of capex. to assets            -0.2301 -0.3331 -0.3055 -0.4417 -0.8269 -0.3097 0.0399 0.0338 -0.3499 -0.0447 -0.0955
 (-0.81)           (-0.96) (-0.88) (-1.21) (-2.40) (-0.78) (0.17) (0.14) (-1.25) (-0.25) (-0.440
Log of PPE ratio -0.0142 -0.0163          -0.0055 -0.0257 -0.0264 -0.0223 -0.1171 -0.1783 -0.0479 0.0034 -0.0038
 (-1.11)           (-1.27) (-0.32) (-1.84) (-1.67) (-1.42) (-1.70) (-2.61) (-0.51) (0.42) (-0.44)
Log of leverage            0.2141 0.0964 0.0794 0.1718 0.0527 0.0432 0.1673 0.1099 0.1221 0.0017 -0.0332
 (3.17)           (1.39) (0.89) (1.77) (0.44) (0.35) (2.70) (1.75) (1.87) (0.03) (-0.49)
Management dummy 0.1584 0.1560          0.1582 0.1195 0.1048 0.0875 0.1042 0.1818 0.1861 0.0575 0.0804
 (6.01)           (5.37) (4.63) (3.53) (2.82) (2.23) (3.76) (5.57) (4.75) (2.79) (3.73)
Survivorship dummy            0.0356 0.0586 0.0855 0.0367 0.0117 0.0284 0.0171 0.0340 0.0524 0.0012 0.0197
 (1.72)           (2.95) (3.42) (1.25) (0.36) (0.87) (0.94) (1.82) (2.33) (0.08) (1.11)
Lagged Ownership          0.3579 0.1042 0.0574 0.8044 0.7114
          (5.01) (1.38) (0.61) (12.32) (10.11)
             
Adjusted R-squared            37.15% 34.57% 25.49% 21.66% 12.80% 10.71% 48.68% 44.54% 38.26% 77.97% 73.37%
 
Table 13TABLE 7 - Determinants of differences in block ownership of spin-offs and matching firms 
The dependent variable is the log of block ownership in year 1, 2 and 3 for the spin-off/match-firm. Market equity is 
the log of the market value of equity. Idiosyncratic risk is the log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard 
error of estimate of the market model that uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. The same calendar 
months are used for the match firm. Q is measured as the market-to-book of assets. The log value is used here. Capex. 
to assets is the log of the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. PPE ratio is the log of the ratio of net property, plant 
and equipment to total assets. Leverage is the log of the book value of debt to book value of assets. Management 
dummy takes on a value of 1 if the officers and directors of the firms own more than 25% of the voting rights of the 
firm, 0 otherwise. Survivorship is a dummy which takes on a value of 1 if the spin-off is still surviving, 0 otherwise. 
Lagged-ownership is the ownership of the parent prior to the spin-off for the spin-offs. It is the ownership in year 1 for 
the matched firm. Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are provided in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
PANEL C 
Log of block ownership spinoff – log of block ownership matching firm 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Intercept -0.0447 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0173 0.0055 -0.0087 
 (-2.59) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-1.42) (0.36) (-0.71) 
Log of market equity -0.0167 -0.0404 -0.0406 -0.0178 -0.0116 -0.0127 
 (-0.81) (-2.16) (-2.56) (-1.25) (-0.87) (-1.31) 
Log of idiosyncratic risk -0.0524 -0.0881 -0.1271 -0.0303 -0.0369 -0.0589 
 (-1.37) (-2.29) (-2.87) (-1.14) (-1.34) (-2.17) 
Log Q (market-to-book) 0.0256 0.0292 0.0624 0.0279 0.0376 0.0313 
 (0.85) (0.97) (1.85) (1.34) (1.77) (1.73) 
Log of capex. to assets -0.0032 -0.0392 -0.0445 -0.0472 -0.0208 -0.0104 
 (-0.10) (-1.53) (-1.32) (-2.01) (-1.15) (-0.51) 
Log of PPE ratio 0.0131 0.0227 0.0273 0.0041 0.0004 -0.0090 
 (0.92) (1.62) (1.82) (0.42) (0.04) (-0.96) 
Log of leverage 0.1697 0.0845 -0.0024 0.0565 0.0678 0.0635 
 (1.87) (0.88) (-0.02) (0.88) (1.00) (1.05) 
Management dummy    0.2115 0.1987 0.2194 
    (10.33) (10.10) (13.29) 
Survivorship dummy 0.0294 0.0363 0.0509 0.0234 0.0259 0.0286 
 (1.06) (1.31) (1.68) (1.22) (1.33) (1.67) 
       
Adjusted R-squared 2.63% 7.68% 10.61% 53.19% 54.33% 67.77% 
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Table 14TABLE 8 – Firm survival, performance and block ownership  
 
PANEL A 
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the spin-off firm is a survivor, 0 otherwise. Firm size is the log of market 
value of equity. Idiosyncratic risk is the log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of estimate of the 
market model that uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. Return on assets is defined as operating 
income before depreciation divided by book value of assets. Q is measured as the market-to-book ratio of assets.  
Change in block ownership is defined as change in the log of the fraction of shares held by all holders who own more 
than 5%.  P-values are in parentheses below the estimates. 
 
 Firm survival using 
1 year change in 
block ownership 
Firm survival using 
2 year change in 
block ownership 
Firm survival using 
3 year change in 
block ownership 
Intercept -.7849 -1.1763 -0.6012 
Log of market equity 0.5980 0.6652 0.7933 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log Q -0.0865 0.0600 -0.0474 
 (0.84) (0.90) (0.91) 
Log of idiosyncratic risk 1.4074 1.5500 2.2062 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
ROA 0.1903 -0.6478 -0.3600 
 (0.92) (0.71) (0.80) 
2.888 3.9691 4.3511 Change in log of block 
ownership (0.19) (0.04) (0.01) 
2.7979 3.7500 4.2734 Log of inherited block  
ownership (0.16) (0.08) (0.04) 
Adjusted % deviation 
explained 2.10 3.60% 7.50% 
 
PANEL B 
The dependent variable is the change in market-to-book ratio. Firm size is the log of market value of equity. 
Idiosyncratic risk is the log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that 
uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. Return on assets is defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by book value of assets. Q is measured as the market-to-book ratio of assets.  Change in block 
ownership is defined as change in the log of the fraction of shares held by all holders who own more than 5%.  
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
  
 2 year change in 
block ownership 
3 year change in 
block ownership 
Intercept -0.4238 -0.4284 
 (-2.26) (-1.95) 
Log of market equity -0.0126 0.0238 
 (-0.58) (0.89) 
ROA 0.1350 -0.1506 
 (0.54) (-0.59) 
Log of idiosyncratic risk -0.1912 -0.1137 
 (-2.36) (-1.67) 
0.3492 0.4120 Change in log of block 
ownership (1.57) (1.69) 
0.2235 0.1580 Log of inherited block  
ownership (0.75) (0.46) 
   
Adjusted R-square 5.08% 1.10% 
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Table 15TABLE 8 – Difference in stock valuation of spin-offs and matching firms  
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio of assets of spinoffs minus the corresponding ratio for the matching 
firms.  All independent variables are similarly measured as the difference between spinoff and matching firm. 
Idiosyncratic risk is the log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that 
uses the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. The same calendar months are used for the match firm. Capex. 
to assets is the log of the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. PPE ratio is the log of the ratio of net property, plant 
and equipment to total assets. Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
 
PANEL C 
  
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Intercept -0.2186 -0.5759 -0.7564 
 (-0.72) (-1.86) (-2.45) 
Log of market equity 0.6211 0.6762 0.5633 
 (4.70) (5.66) (6.39) 
Log of idiosyncratic risk 6.224 5.6184 5.0288 
 (2.93) (2.67) (2.10) 
Log of capex. to assets 5.6473 5.1948 5.7050 
 (2.21) (1.97) (2.36) 
Log of PPE ratio -0.7961 -0.2140 -0.9419 
 (-1.21) (-0.32) (-1.27) 
Log of block own. 0.0673 0.2597 0.4264 
 (0.37) (1.67) (2.39) 
    
Adjusted R-square 22.52% 23.45% 32.55% 
 
PANEL D 
Q is measured as the market-to-book of assets. Tercile 1 is lowest (Q) and Tercile 3 is the highest (Q) 
 
  Spin-off  
 Q Q Q 
 Tercile1 Tercile2 Tercile3 
Inherited block ownership 0.1813 0.2252 0.2047 
 Spinoff block ownership 0.2637 0.2754 0.1879 
Change in block ownership 0.0806 0.0502 -0.0238 
 
Table 16TABLE 9 - Firm performance and block ownership 
The dependent variables are the long of block ownership of spin-off/match firms and log of Q measured as the market to book of assets. Market equity is the log of the market 
value of equity. Sales is the log of sales. Idiosyncratic risk is the log of the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of estimate of the market model that uses the first 36 
months of the spin-off firm’s existence. The same calendar months are used for the match firm. Capex. to assets is the log of the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. PPE ratio is 
the log of the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. Leverage is the log of the book value of debt to book value of assets. Management dummy takes on a value 
of 1 if the officers and directors of the firms own more than 25% of the voting rights of the firm, 0 otherwise.  ROA is return on assets, defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by book value of assets.  T-stats are in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
  Spin-off Match firm  
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
             BlkOwn Q BlkOwn Q BlkOwn Q BlkOwn Q BlkOwn Q BlkOwn Q
Intercept 0.3586            1.9729 0.2725 1.0427 0.2548 0.9825 0.2115 0.7674 0.2314 0.7192 0.2031 0.8119
 (5.97)            (6.27) (4.90) (3.46) (5.60) (3.91) (3.68) (2.90) (4.08) (2.84) (5.07) (4.64)
Log of market equity -0.0131        -0.0230  -0.0094  -0.0122  -0.0115  -0.0208
 (-2.03)         (-3.38)  (-1.54)  (-1.79) (-1.94)  (-2.95)
Log of sales             -0.1846 -0.1043 -0.1325 -0.0162 -0.0218 -0.0556
             (-6.84) (-3.86) (-5.59) (-1.17) (-1.86) (-2.32)
Log of idiosyn. risk 0.03788            0.2140 -0.0309 0.0307 -0.0065 -0.1890 -0.0062 0.2126 -0.0037 0.1146 -0.0368 0.0464
 (1.54)            (1.84) (-1.17) (0.28) (-0.22) (-2.09) (-0.22) (0.194) (-0.12) (1.05) (-1.68) (0.61)
Log of capex. to assets -0.2780      0.0254  -0.2087  -0.3252  -0.3913  -0.3512
 (-0.94)         (0.07)  (-0.74)  (-0.94) (-1.31)  (-1.41)
Log of PPE ratio -0.1199         -0.1472  -0.1078  0.0303 0.0273  0.0322
 (-1.78)         (-2.19)  (-1.73)  (0.33) (0.29)  (0.47)
Log of leverage 0.2205         0.1497  0.1444  0.0946 0.0519  0.0312
 (3.24)         (2.11)  (1.95)  (0.95) (0.48)  (0.40)
Mgt. dummy 0.1502         0.1614  0.1872  0.2011 0.2122  0.2106
 (6.38)         (5.78)  (7.52)  (8.05) (8.11)  (12.13)
ROA             2.3131 1.7096 1.0777 0.6713 0.5992 0.5095
             (4.99) (4.56) (4.30) (1.72) (1.81) (1.75)
Q -0.0115         0.0203  0.1872  0.0600 0.0399  0.0548
 (-0.41)         (0.45)  (0.21)  (1.62) (1.03)  (1.88)
Log of block own.             -1.3000 -0.7465 -0.4652 0.5071 0.2651 0.1364
             (-2.17) (-1.20) (-0.88) (1.11) (0.61) (0.45)
Adjusted R Squared 37.56%            33.48% 34.26% 17.94% 29.55% 15.81% 46.28% 13.23% 45.83% 8.76% 48.07% 9.61%
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Vertical relatedness is calculated (Fan & Lang 2000) as follows. Define aij as the dollar value of industry i’s output to produce industry j’s total output. Vij is defined as aij divided 
by the dollar output of industry j. The relatedness of spinoffs and parents is calculated as ½(Vij+ Vji) where i and j are the parent and spinoff industry respectively (Fan and Lang 
2000 provides the concordance between SIC codes and the input-output tables). Complementarity is calculated (Fan & Lang 2000) as follows. For spinoff industry i calculate the 
fraction supplied to each other industry k (except the parent industry). This gives us a vector Vik . In a similar manner calculate Bik as the fraction obtained as input from each 
industry (except the parent industry). Calculate corresponding vectors Vjk and Bjk where j is the parent industry. Complementarity is calculated as ½(corr(Vik Vjk)+corr(Bik Bik )).  
Panel B – Mean relatedness and complementarity by sameness of SIC codes 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
  
Table 17TABLE 10 – Industry relatedness of spinoffs and parents using Input-Output Tables 
 
 
 
Vertical relatedness Complementarity
 
Spinoff 
and 
Parent 
All industry 
pairs (Fan & 
Lang 2000) 
Spinoff 
and Parent 
All industry 
pairs (Fan & 
Lang 2000) 
Mean  0.0215 0.0119 0.4330 0.1347
75% percentile     0.0145 0.0002 0.6316 0.1784
Median 0.0037    0.0000 0.3407 0.0895
25% percentile     0.0004 0.0000 0.1733 0.0424
Std. Dev 0.0518   0.3301 
 
Vertical Relatedness Complementarity
  Same Different  Same Different
1 Digit SIC Code 0.0232 0.0195 1.0000 0.3491*** 
2 Digit SIC Code 0.0352 0.0156** 0.9693 0.3288*** 
3 Digit SIC Code 0.0390 0.0184* 0.7342 0.2971*** 
4 Digit SIC Code 0.0454 0.1830** 0.5844 0.2530*** 
 
 
*, ** and *** denote differences at the 10%,5% and 1% level 
 
Table 18TABLE 11– Share activity around the between the record date and effective date  
Record period turnover is the average fraction of parent firms shares traded daily in the 10 day period prior to the 
issuance of the spinoff shares. This period is used as a proxy for the period between the record date and the effective 
date of the spinoff. Abnormal record period turnover is measured as the ratio of the daily share turnover in this 10 day 
period to the daily share turnover in the 10 day period immediately preceding.  
 
Panel A – Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Record period 
turnover (x 10-3) 
Abnormal record period 
turnover 
Average 8.093 1.327*** 
Median 3.950 1.172*** 
75th percentile 7.542 1.512 
25th percentile 2.304 0.822 
Std. Dev. 16.299 0.722 
Skewness 27.381 9.836 
Kurtosis 92.881 17.517 
*** denotes the ratio is different from 1 at the 1% level 
 
Panel B – Regression results 
The dependent variable is the log of block ownership of the spin-off firm in year 3 minus the log of block ownership of 
the parent firm prior to the spin-off. Relative market equity is the log of the ratio of the market equity of the spin-off to 
the parent prior to the spin-off. Relative Q is measured similarly using the log of the market-to-book of assets ratio. 
Relative idiosyncratic risk is measured as the log standard error of estimate of the market model that uses the first 36 
months of the spin-off firm’s existence. For the parent firm the 36 months preceding the first firm announcement of the 
spin-off are used. Relatedness is the log of the stock return correlation calculated as  the correlation between the 
monthly stock return of the parent and spin-off in the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence Survivorship is a 
dummy which takes on a value of 1 if the spin-off is still surviving , 0 otherwise. Ownership rank is the tercile rank of 
the spin-off firm ranked upon the basis of block ownership of the parent prior to the spin-off.  
 
Record period turnover is the average fraction of parent firms shares traded daily in the 10 day period prior to the 
issuance of the spinoff shares. This period is used as a proxy for the period between the record date and the effective 
date of the spinoff. Abnormal record period turnover is measured as the ratio of the daily share turnover in this 10 day 
period to the daily share turnover in the 10 day period immediately preceding. Both variables are used in log form. 
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
 
Change in log of block ownership of the spin-off firm from yr0 to yr1 
Intercept 0.0594 0.0425 0.0448 0.0979 0.1335 
 (2.99) (3.76) (2.13) (2.70) (3.68) 
Record period turnover -0.0175  -0.0018  -0.0061 
 (-1.54)  (-0.13)  (-0.38) 
Abnormal record period turnover  -0.0575*** -0.0554**  0.0172 
  (-2.52) (-1.97)  (0.52) 
Relative market equity    -0.0204 -0.0115* 
    (-1.69) (-1.85) 
Relative idiosync. risk    -0.0245 -0.2885 
    -0.78 (-1.13) 
Relative Q    -0.0551 -0.0601* 
    (-1.89) (-1.67) 
Ownership rank    -0.0855 -0.0482*** 
    (-5.21) (-3.86) 
Survivorship dummy    0.0481 0.0510** 
    (1.89) (1.92) 
Adjusted R-square 1.17% 4.14% 3.59% 27.88% 25.85% 
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Table 19TABLE 12 – Replication of Morck Shleifer Vishny piece-wise linear regression models 
 
Panel A – Frequency distribution of block and managerial ownership 
Distribution of block ownership and managerial of sample firms is reported. Also the distribution using Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny’s breakpoints of 5% and 25% are also reported. The breakpoint of 5% is not usable for data collected from 
proxy statements because the minimum block size in the proxy statement is 5%. 
 
Distribution of block ownership 
Level of block 
ownership Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
0%-5% 9 5 9 
5%-10% 13 14 12 
10%-15% 12 10 13 
15%-20% 17 9 12 
20%-25% 17 23 10 
25%-30% 8 10 13 
30%-40% 21 24 17 
40%-50% 15 12 18 
>50% 5 10 13 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny breakpoints of 5% and 25% 
0%-5% 9 5 9 
>5% -25% 59 56 47 
>25% 49 56 61 
Using breakpoints of 10% and 25% 
0%-10% 22 19 21 
>10% -25% 46 42 35 
>25% 49 56 61 
 
Distribution of managerial ownership 
Level of mgr. 
ownership Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
0%-5% 74 70 60 
5%-10% 8 13 22 
10%-15% 7 7 8 
15%-20% 7 9 7 
20%-25% 7 6 8 
25%-30% 4 3 1 
30%-45% 8 8 10 
>45% 2 1 1 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny breakpoints of 5% and 25% 
0%-5% 74 70 60 
>5% -25% 29 35 45 
>25% 14 12 12 
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Table 20TABLE 12 – Replication of Morck Shleifer Vishny piece-wise linear regression models 
Panel B – Piece-wise linear regression results using block ownership  
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio of spinoffs.  Firm size is measured as the log market value of equity 
of spinoffs.  Relative idiosyncratic risk is measured as the log standard error of estimate of the market model that uses 
the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. Capex-to-assets is the capital expenditure divided by the book value 
of assets. Ownership 0 to 10 takes on the value of block ownership for levels of less than 10% and 10% otherwise. 
Ownership 10 to 25 takes on the value of zero for block ownership levels below 10%, block ownership minus 10% for 
levels between 10 and 25% , and 25% otherwise. Ownership over 25 takes on the value of 0 for levels below 25% and 
ownership minus 25% otherwise. Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are provided below each coefficient estimate. 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year1 Year2 Year3 
Intercept 1.7574 1.1263 0.6902 2.5071 1.9257 1.8584 
 6.91 4.63 2.47 (3.20) (2.72) (2.87) 
Firm Size 0.1695 0.1061 0.1234 0.2041 0.1422 0.1739 
 6.46 4.13 3.87 (2.77) (2.12) (2.46) 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.1669 0.0109 -0.2212 0.9039 0.3615 0.3683 
 2.53 0.10 -1.82 (3.48) (1.79) (1.29) 
Capex-to-assets 2.2448 1.6399 1.0668 3.6425 2.3015 2.8332 
 5.20 4.63 3.14 (1.25) (0.75) (1.03) 
Ownership 0 to 10    -0.5242 -3.7036 -8.4475 
    (-0.12) (-0.77) (-2.01) 
Ownership 10 to 25    -0.9937 -1.077 0.8245 
    (-0.65) (-0.80) (0.58) 
Ownership over 25    -1.3946 0.0305 -0.0394 
    (-0.88) (0.02) (-0.03) 
Adjusted R-square 34.16% 24.14% 14.41% 12.66% 5.28% 5.82% 
 
Panel C – Piece-wise linear regression results using managerial ownership  
The dependent variable is the market-to-book ratio of spinoffs.  Firm size is measured as the log market value of equity 
of spinoffs.  Relative idiosyncratic risk is measured as the log standard error of estimate of the market model that uses 
the first 36 months of the spin-off firm’s existence. Capex-to-assets is the capital expenditure divided by the book value 
of assets. Ownership 0 to 5 takes on the value of managerial ownership for levels of less than 5% and 5% otherwise. 
Ownership 5 to 25 takes on the value of zero for managerial ownership levels below 5%, managerial ownership minus 
5% for levels between 5 and 25% , and 25% otherwise. Ownership over 25 takes on the value of 0 for levels below 
25% and ownership minus 25% otherwise. Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are provided below each coefficient 
estimate. 
 
 Year1 Year2 Year3 Year1 Year2 Year3 
Intercept 0.9438 0.4333 0.2871 1.3892 0.7443 0.7756 
 (4.04) (1.82) (0.87) (1.87) (1.07) (1.01) 
Firm Size 0.2204 0.1420 0.1411 0.2539 0.1916 0.1974 
 (7.18) (5.17) (4.08) (3.38) (2.81) (2.60) 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.1417 0.0111 -0.2042 0.7726 0.3343 0.3566 
 (2.19) (0.10) (-1.85) (2.88) (1.86) (1.24) 
Capex-to-assets 2.9842 2.1376 1.3267 4.1932 3.1403 3.4968 
 (5.77) (4.93) (2.78) (1.41) (0.96) (1.24) 
Ownership 0 to 5    10.4414 8.5248 6.4485 
    (1.35) (1.15) (0.73) 
Ownership 5 to 25    -1.2470 -1.0545 -0.1411 
    (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.06) 
Ownership over 25    -0.21 0.6157 -0.0580 
    (-0.11) (0.38) (-0.03) 
Adjusted R-square 29.44% 23.21% 12.41% 10.88% 3.79% 2.74% 
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Table 21TABLE 13 – Year-wise distribution of mergers 
 
Year Number announced Number effective 
1995 20 4 
1996 15 19 
1997 41 29 
1998 34 45 
1999 31 32 
2000 - 12 
Total 141 141 
Assets is the book value of assets in $  million. Market value of equity is also in $ million. The market-to-book ratio of assets is measured as the (the book value of assets + the 
market value of equity - the book value of equity) / book value of assets. The market-to-book ratio of equity is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
ROA is operating income divided by book value of assets. ROE is net income divided by the market value of equity. Stock return correlation is the correlation in monthly returns 
of the acquirer and target in the 60 months prior to the announcement of the merger. 
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Table 22TABLE 14 Firm characteristics of the acquirer and target firms 
 
 Count Average Median Std. Min. Max.
25th 
% 75th % Skewness Kurtosis 
Acq. Assets 141 29031 12108 50247 396 303989 4501 23034 16.07 28.83 
Acq. Mkt. val. eqty. 141 5550 2232 8977 59 65787 800 5542 17.10 40.18 
Acq. MTB Assets 141          1.127 1.107 0.087 0.993 1.548 1.073 1.171 8.62 12.29
Acq. MTB Equity 141 2.586 2.410 0.983 0.890 5.988 1.878 3.108 5.16 2.65 
Acq. ROA 141          0.029 0.028 0.006 0.014 0.045 0.025 0.032 0.41 0.08
Acq. ROE           141 0.155 0.150 0.053 0.059 0.352 0.112 0.186 4.63 3.15
Tar. Aassets 141 5401 1039 15150 66 114096 411 3520 27.92 90.79 
Tar. Mkt. val. eqty. 141 876 184 2422 13 24143 73 638 33.90 149.93 
Tar. MTB Assets 141 1.083 1.080 0.063 0.974 1.358 1.034 1.121 4.56 4.61 
Tar. MTB Equity 141 1.955 1.860 0.746 0.799 5.003 1.413 2.400 4.58 3.15 
Tar. ROA 141          0.026 0.026 0.006 0.007 0.045 0.021 0.030 0.52 1.14
Tar. ROE           141 0.170 0.147 0.079 0.064 0.512 0.120 0.191 9.53 12.55
 
 Count      Average Median Std. Min. Max.
25th 
% 75th % Skewness Kurtosis 
tassets/aassets           141 0.246*** 0.149*** 0.327 0.006 1.961 0.042 0.298 14.09 24.24
teqty/aeqty 141          0.213*** 0.127*** 0.267 0.003 1.470 0.039 0.278 11.27 14.38
troa/aroa 141          0.922*** 0.905*** 0.231 0.374 1.737 0.753 1.074 1.34 1.08
troe/aroe           141 1.144*** 1.080*** 0.458 0.368 3.270 0.798 1.390 7.59 10.55
tmtba/amtba           141 0.964*** 0.966*** 0.064 0.699 1.197 0.938 0.997 -3.71 8.73
tmtbe/amtbe           141 0.806*** 0.766*** 0.299 0.253 2.058 0.617 0.963 5.02 5.51
Stock return correlation 141 0.188*** 0.159*** 0.159 -0.063 0.726 0.073 0.255 5.25 2.79 
*** denotes significantly different from 1 (0 for stock return correlation) at the 1% level 
 
Table 23TABLE 15 PANEL A – Geographical separation of acquirers and targets 
 N 
At least one 
target director 
hired 
Number of 
target directors 
hired 
Target and acquirer from the same state 66 0.73 2.14 
Target and acquirer from different states 75 0.49 1.52 
 
 
PANEL B - Loan portfolio of targets and acquirers 
 Ratio of loans to total assets 
 Acquirer Target 
N 109 54 
Average 0.6263 0.6002 
Median 0.6415 0.6268 
Std. Dev. 0.0998 0.1170 
Min. 0.0738 0.1939 
Max. 0.7951 0.8335 
Lower Quartile 0.5865 0.5365 
Upper Quartile 0.6891 0.6577 
Skewness -9.282 -2.497 
Kurtosis 18.728 2.738 
 
 
PANEL C - Loan composition of targets and acquirers 
 
Fraction of loans to 
individuals in loan portfolio 
Fraction of industrial 
loans in loan portfolio 
Fraction of real estate 
loans in loan portfolio 
 Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
N 109 54 109 54 109 54 
Average 0.1730 0.1117 0.2271 0.1755 0.5631 0.6849 
Median 0.1737 0.0690 0.2032 0.1693 0.5794 0.6781 
Std. Dev. 0.0796 0.1045 0.1233 0.0967 0.1449 0.1634 
Min. 0.0264 0.0055 0.0711 0.0000 0.0572 0.3224 
Max. 0.4393 0.4741 0.8859 0.4381 0.8660 0.9842 
Lower Quartile 0.1112 0.0296 0.1389 0.1209 0.4408 0.5721 
Upper Quartile 0.2205 0.1802 0.2707 0.2109 0.6819 0.8090 
Skewness 2.706 3.869 8.928 1.453 -2.185 -0.248 
Kurtosis 0.771 2.225 15.589 0.639 0.464 -1.102 
Means (medians) of acquirer and target are different at the 1% level 
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Table 24TABLE 15 PANEL D- Distance measures 
Comp_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans to individuals acq. – fraction of loans to individuals target) + Abs(Fraction of 
real estate loans acq. – fraction of real estate loans target) + Abs(Fraction of industrial loans acq. – fraction of industrial 
loans target) 
Loan_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans in total assets acq. – Fraction of loans in total assets target) 
 
 Loan_distance Comp_distance 
N 46 46 
Average 0.1092 0.4030 
Median 0.0691 0.2986 
Std. Dev. 0.1111 0.2948 
Min. 0.0092 0.0554 
Max. 0.4781 1.3848 
Lower Quartile 0.0452 0.1896 
Upper Quartile 0.1263 0.5625 
Skewness 5.740 3.532 
Kurtosis 5.856 1.976 
 
Table 25TABLE 16 Board characteristics of the acquirer and target firms 
 Average Median Std. Min. Max. 25th % 75th % Skewness Kurtosis 
Acquirer 
Board Size          14.62 13.50 4.41 7.00 26.00 11.00 18.00 2.45 -1.47
% outsiders          61.04% 60.00% 15.74% 0.08% 93.33% 50.00% 73.91% -1.90 -0.04
% insiders          16.86% 16.23% 9.15% 3.85% 55.56% 9.76% 22.65% 6.25 7.15
Median Age          59.96 60.00 4.00 51.50 72.00 56.75 62.50 0.82 -0.01
Median Tenure          8.44 8.00 3.60 1.00 22.50 6.00 10.00 3.53 3.54
% Ownership          7.06 5.03 7.24 0.00 47.00 2.91 8.30 14.04 25.20
CEO's stake          1.31 0.51 1.93 0.06 13.74 0.51 1.40 4.48 23.16
# of firms where CEO is not chairman                             33 
Target 
Board Size          11.35 10.00 4.77 5.00 26.00 8.00 14.00 5.63 2.48
% outsiders          51.80% 50.00% 17.20% 0.00% 87.50% 40.00% 66.66% -1.44 -0.41
% insiders          23.46% 22.22% 12.85% 0.00% 80.00% 13.64% 30.77% 6.56 7.76
Median Age          58.31 59.00 10.28 0.00 77.00 55.50 62.00 -18.45 49.63
Median Tenure          10.61 10.00 5.33 1.00 31.00 6.00 13.50 4.76 3.59
% Ownership          15.39 12.50 11.03 1.00 50.70 6.92 20.80 5.32 1.54
CEO's stake          3.23 1.98 4.84 0.00 37.80 0.60 4.09 4.56 25.62
# of firms where CEO is not chairman                              69 
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 N Average Median Std. Min. Max. 25th % 75th % Skewness Kurtosis 
Board Size           
Pre-Merger             141 14.62 13.5 4.41 7 26 11 18 2.45 -1.47
Post-Merger           141 16.21 16.0 4.59 7 28 13 20 1.43 -0.39
Change in board size 141          1.64 1.00 3.23 -6.00 18.00 0.00 3.00 8.13 15.25
% change in board size 141          0.142 0.083 0.278 -0.300 1.800 0.000 0.233 13.65 30.15
           
% Insiders           
Pre-Merger    141 0.169 0.162 0.092 0.038 0.556 0.098 0.226 6.25 7.15
Post-Merger           141 0.159 0.154 0.077 0.038 0.500 0.095 0.200 4.90 5.62
Change in % insiders 141          -0.009 0.000 0.048 -0.190 0.113 -0.025 0.010 -2.52 4.11
% change in % insiders 141          -0.015 0.000 0.373 -0.627 2.000 -0.190 0.101 11.81 23.24
           
% Outsiders           
Pre-Merger    141 0.610 0.600 0.157 0.083 0.933 0.500 0.739 -1.90 -0.04
Post-Merger           141 0.607 0.611 0.150 0.083 0.929 0.524 0.727 -1.90 0.43
Change in % outsiders 141          -0.004 0.000 0.095 -0.335 0.215 -0.050 0.054 -2.27 2.33
% change in % outsiders 141          -0.011 0.000 0.167 -0.478 0.484 -0.096 0.076 -1.03 2.18
           
Number from target 141          1.80 1.00 2.34 0.00 12.00 0.00 3.00 9.49 10.94
           
Number of new directors 141          3.48 3.00 3.03 0.00 17.00 1.00 5.00 7.94 10.96
           
1 if target CEO picked 141 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.06 -4.47 
           
Number (%) of firms with at least one director from the target               85 (60.3%) 
Number (%) of firms with a decrease in board size                                  25 (17.7%) 
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Table 26TABLE 17 – Comparison of acquirer board before and after merger 
 
 
Table 27TABLE 18 – Determinants of the survivor board size 
The market-to-book ratio of equity is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. ROE is net 
income divided by the market value of equity. Acquirer (target) board ownership is the ownership of all acquirer 
(target) directors. 
 
Dependent variable – log of survivor board size 
  
0.5730 -3.353 Intercept 
(3.67) (-2.36) 
0.7254 0.807 log(Acquirer Board Size) 
(13.66) (14.75) 
0.1110 0.086 log(Target Board Size) 
(2.72) (2.00) 
 0.043 log(Target Mkt. Val. of Equity) - log(Acquirer Mkt. Val. of Equity) 
 (2.79) 
 0.079 log(Target market to book of equity)-log(Acquirer market to book of equity) 
 (1.56) 
 0.118 log(Target ROE)-log(Acquirer ROE) 
 (2.50) 
 0.550 log(Acquirer Mean Director Age) 
 (1.85) 
 0.392 log(Target Mean Director Age) 
 (1.85) 
 0.011 log(1+Acquirer Board Ownership) 
 (0.46) 
 0.005 log(1+Target Board Ownership) 
 (0.19) 
Adjusted R-square 60.35% 67.89% 
N 141 141 
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are in parentheses   
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Table 28TABLE 19 – Logit model for the probability that at least one target director is hired 
Same state dummy is a variable that take a value if the acquirer and target are headquartered in the same state, 0 
otherwise. The market-to-book ratio of equity is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
ROE is net income divided by the market value of equity. Stock return correlation is the correlation in monthly returns 
of the acquirer and target in the 60 months prior to the announcement of the merger. 
Comp_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans to individuals acq. – fraction of loans to individuals target) + Abs(Fraction of 
real estate loans acq. – fraction of real estate loans target) + Abs(Fraction of industrial loans acq. – fraction of industrial 
loans target) 
Loan_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans in total assets acq. – Fraction of loans in total assets target)  
 
  
Intercept -4.2199 -4.2881 -23619 
2.7262 1.3342 0.9882 log(Acquirer Board Size) 
(2.61) (0.81 (0.47) 
-0.0267 -7.9644 -1.7772 log(Target Board Size) 
(-0.03) (-0.87) (-1.23) 
2.0484 5.7295 1.3351 log(Target Mkt. Val. of Equity) - log(Acquirer Mkt. Val. of Equity) 
(4.84) (3.65) (2.45) 
2.1401 2.0799 5.3689 log(Target ROE)-log(Acquirer ROE) 
(2.46) (2.78) (2.45) 
0.8852 10.4803 4.2546 log(Target market to book of equity)-log(Acquirer market to book of 
equity) (0.95) (3.10) (2.05) 
0.6080 3.5267 0.6247 log(1+Acquirer Board Ownership) 
(2.07) (2.41) (0.62) 
-0.5116 2.4167 -0.1199 log(1+Target Board Ownership) 
(-0.94) (-0.11) (-0.14) 
-0.1376 -2.2580 -0.5410 log(1+Target CEO ownership) 
(-0.22) (-0.76) (-0.67) 
1.7088 5.0216 3.8504 log(Acquirer Mean Director Age) 
(0.32) (0.22) (0.37) 
-0.8708 5.3611 3.6834 log(Target Mean Director Age) 
(-0.21) (0.56) (0.33) 
0.3554 0.7321 0.7836 Same state dummy 
(0.56) (0.43) (0.64) 
-3.1401   log(Stock Return Correlation) 
(-2.10)   
 -3.7564  loan_distance 
 (-2.39)  
  -2.0660 comp_distance 
  (-1.03) 
Adjusted R-square 34.73% 49.42% 30.59% 
N 141 46 46 
T-stats are in parentheses 
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Table 29TABLE 20 – Determinants of the number of target directors hired 
Same state dummy is a variable that take a value if the acquirer and target are headquartered in the same state, 0 
otherwise. The market-to-book ratio of equity is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
ROE is net income divided by the market value of equity. Stock return correlation is the correlation in monthly returns 
of the acquirer and target in the 60 months prior to the announcement of the merger. 
Comp_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans to individuals acq. – fraction of loans to individuals target) + Abs(Fraction of 
real estate loans acq. – fraction of real estate loans target) + Abs(Fraction of industrial loans acq. – fraction of industrial 
loans target) 
Loan_distance = Abs(Fraction of loans in total assets acq. – Fraction of loans in total assets target)  
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Intercept -5.1052 1.2721 2.7799 -5.9869 5.2512 4.7590 
       
0.4879 0.2672 0.2434 0.4267 0.2537 0.2439 log(Acquirer Board Size) 
(3.45) (1.10) (1.01) (2.22) (0.55) (0.54) 
0.2616 0.0205 -0.0393 0.4293 0.1396 0.1201 log(Target Board Size) 
(2.26) (0.15) (-0.27) (2.61) (0.43) (0.38) 
0.4129 0.3503 0.3398 0.4500 0.3245 0.3253 log(Target Mkt. Val. of Equity) - 
log(Acquirer Mkt. Val. of Equity) (9.54) (5.45) (5.36) (7.85) (2.42) (2.51) 
0.4119 0.6717 0.7307 0.3294 0.5390 0.5514 log(Target ROE)-log(Acquirer ROE) 
(3.33) (2.77) (3.03) (3.01) (1.75) (1.56) 
0.2191 0.5964 0.6926 0.2224 0.5346 0.5231 log(Target market to book of equity)-
log(Acquirer market to book of equity) (1.75) (2.27) (2.69) (1.88) (1.01) (0.94) 
0.1085 0.0744 0.0413 0.1171 0.1212 0.1214 log(1+Acquirer Board Ownership) 
(1.51) (0.78) (0.41) (2.26) (0.96) (0.98) 
-0.1629 -0.1341 -0.1375 -0.1812 -0.1864 -0.1911 log(1+Target Board Ownership) 
(-2.10) (-1.27) (-1.83) (-2.22) (-2.07) (-2.13) 
0.0014 -0.1297 -0.1324 0.0346 -0.0954 -0.0937 log(1+Target CEO ownership) 
(0.02) (-1.45) (-1.50) (0.25) (-0.10) (-0.22) 
0.6513 -0.1447 -0.4396 0.7286 -0.8141 -0.8559 log(Acquirer Mean Director Age) 
(0.83) (-0.12) (-0.38) (0.65) (-0.21) (-0.17) 
0.6357 0.1707 0.1771 0.7267 -0.1939 -0.1200 log(Target Mean Director Age) 
(1.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.98) (-0.40) (-0.02) 
0.0404 0.1385 0.1435 0.0614 0.2166 0.2629 Same state dummy 
(0.48) (0.88) (0.98) (0.55) (1.24) (1.09) 
-0.7297   -0.8450   log(Stock Return Correlation) 
(-1.94)   (-1.81)   
 -0.4468   0.2761  loan_distance 
 (-0.86)   (0.34)  
  -0.2574   -0.0335 comp_distance 
  (-1.24)   (-0.05) 
Adjusted R-square 65.06% 78.11% 78.64% 73.85% 32.07% 31.78% 
N 141 46 46 141 46 46 
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are in parentheses 
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Table 30TABLE 21 – Pooling multiple acquisitions by the same acquirer 
PANEL A 
Number of acquisitions Frequency 
1 60 
2 11 
3 9 
4 4 
5 2 
6 1 
 
PANEL B 
 
Survivor 
board size 
Probability of 
representation 
Extent of 
representation 
-1.5693 -2.6409 -5.8502 Intercept 
(-1.01)  (-1.24) 
0.8151 2.9047 0.4374 log(Acquirer Board Size) 
(11.77) (1.83) (2.08) 
0.1038 0.3435 0.3699 log(Target Board Size) 
(1.90) (0.21) (2.00) 
0.0686 1.6495 0.3499 log(Target Mkt. Val. of Equity) - log(Acquirer 
Mkt. Val. of Equity) (3.50) (4.51) (5.89) 
0.0979 1.3552 0.3419 log(Target market to book of equity)-
log(Acquirer market to book of equity) (2.85) (0.77) (1.51) 
0.1842 2.6 0.352 log(Target ROE)-log(Acquirer ROE) 
(1.31) (1.87) (1.80) 
0.307  0.4464 log(Acquirer Mean Director Age) 
(0.86)  (0.41) 
0.1721  0.9646 log(Target Mean Director Age) 
(1.03)  (1.95) 
0.0672 1.2901 0.2272 log(1+Acquirer Board Ownership) 
(2.28) (1.73) (2.53) 
-0.0240 -1.2559 -0.2645 log(1+Target Board Ownership) 
(-0.59) (-1.41) (-2.13) 
-0.1346 -0.026 log(1+Target CEO ownership)  (-0.21) (-0.20) 
Adjusted R-square 72.73% 23.11% 61.65% 
N 87 87 87 
Heteroscedasticity consistent T-stats are in parentheses 
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ble 31TABLE 22 – Mode of payment used in the acquisition 
 
 
Mode of payment Frequency 
No. of cash deals 4 
No. of cash/stock deals 6 
No. of cash & stock deals 5 
No. of pure stock deals 126 
  
Total 141 
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Table 32Figure 1A – Block ownership of Bestfoods and Corn Products 
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Table 33Figure 1B – Managerial ownership of Bestfoods and Corn Products 
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 Table 34Figure 2A – CAR graphs for classes of spinoffs based on survival 
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Table 35Figure 2B – CAR graphs for terciles of spinoffs (and corresponding matching firms) formed on the basis of 1 year changes in block ownership 
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